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approach to severability, outlined in the three severability principles ofAlaska Airlines, Inc. .
Brock. The Note argues that although two of the principles are constitutional-law principles, the
third is federal common law -a fact that gives courts flexibility to tailor severability doctrine to
the special characteristics of omnibus lawmaking. The Note then proposes a solution to the
problem of applying severability doctrine to omnibus statutes: the constitutional incompatibility
option, an approach pioneered by the German Constitutional Court. When employing the
constitutional incompatibility option, courts engage in a dialogue with the legislature by severing
the unconstitutional portions of a statute while temporarily enjoining the decision's effect.
Applied in the United States, the constitutional incompatibility option would give Congress the
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having to dismantle a massive legislative project on account of a minor constitutional blemish.
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HOW TO TRIM A CHRISTMAS TREE
INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decided National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) in 2012,' the public and the press focused on the
Court's merits rulings.' Another important aspect of the opinion received
relatively little notice. The four joint dissenters -Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito - spelled out the remedy they would have chosen had their
merits position prevailed: they would have struck down the Affordable Care
Act (ACA), that massive legislative project, in its entirety.'
The dissenters invoked a novel legal theory to justify this far-reaching
remedy. In general, federal courts presume that a freestanding statutory
provision, such as the ACA's individual mandate, is severable from the rest of
the statute. As the length and complexity of the statute increases, so does the
strength of this presumption- the more expansive a statute, the less
problematic it should be to excise an unconstitutional provision. The dissenters
in NFIB reversed this presumption. According to the dissenters, the ACA was a
lengthy statute containing a multitude of provisions unrelated to its core
purpose. The dissenters characterized it as a "Christmas tree" law, with
" many nongermane ornaments."4 They reasoned that, without proof that
Congress would have enacted these "ornaments" in the absence of the
individual mandate, the entire "Christmas tree" had to fall.s Under the
dissenters' new theory, the unorthodox bargaining process that generates long,
complex statutes- so-called "omnibus statutes" -makes provisions in these
statutes presumptively inseverable. The length and complexity of a statute
weighs against, rather than in favor of, severability.
Although it appears unlikely that the dissenters' "Christmas-tree" approach
will gain much traction, the question of how to determine the severability of
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Upholds Health Care Law, 5-4, in Victory for Obama,
N.Y. TIMEs (June 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/o6/29/us/supreme-court-lets
-health-law-largely-stand.html [http://perma.cc/JRM2-63H5]. The Court upheld the
individual- mandate provisions of the ACA as a valid exercise of the Taxing Clause power
and invalidated the provision allowing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
withdraw existing Medicaid funds if states declined to expand their Medicaid programs. 132
S. Ct. at 2601, 2607.
3. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
4. Id. at 2675. For example, the law contains a provision "requiring chain restaurants to
display nutritional content." Id.
5. Id. at 2675-76.
6. Since NFIB was handed down, no federal court has signaled its approval of the "Christmas-
tree" principle in a case in which it applied severability doctrine. See Exec. Benefits Ins.
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omnibus bills remains important to resolve. An increasing number of federal
statutes follow the pattern of the ACA.7 Today's Congress tends to pass long,
complex statutes that reflect numerous compromises and bargains. Because
omnibus statutes do not fall under the purview of a single congressional
committee, they are less likely than ordinary statutes to be internally
consistent.8 Further hindering courts' interpretive enterprise, omnibus statutes
are rarely accompanied by clear records of legislative intent. As one
Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014); United States v. Brune, 767 F.3d loo9, 1019
(ioth Cir. 2014); Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 434 (Sth Cir.
2014); Ameur v. Gates, 759 F. 3d 317, 324-25 (4th Cir. 2014); United States ex rel. Bunk v.
Gosselin World Wide Moving N.V., 741 F.3d 390, 405 (4th Cir. 2013); Hamad v. Gates, 732
F.3d 990, 1000-03 (9th Cir. 2013); Sanders Cty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Fox, 717 F-3d
1090, 1092 f.1 ( 9 th Cir. 2013); Am. Fed'n of State, Cry. & Mun. Emps. Council 79 V. Scott,
717 F-3d 851, 871 (ilth Cir. 2013); MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 166 (4 th Cit. 2013);
Bell v. Keating, 697 F.3d 445, 463-64 (7th Cir. 2012); Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F-3d
61, 77-78 (1st Cit. 2012); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d
1332, 1340-41 (D.C. Cit. 2012); Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, No. 5:15-CV-122-DAE, 2015 WL
4887462, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Aug.17, 2015); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs.,
Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00292-SEB-TAB, 2015 WL 1013508, at *ii (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015); Frank
v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 863 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014); Edwards
v. Beck, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1097-1101 (E.D. Ark. 2014); Democratic Party of Haw. v. Nago,
982 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175 (D. Haw. 2013); Burrow v. Sybaris Clubs Int'l, Inc., No. 13 C
2342, 2013 WL 5967333, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2013); Barrett v. Claycomb, 976 F. Supp.
2d 1104, 1135 (W.D. Mo. 2013); United States v. King, No. 99 CR 952-1, 2013 WL 40o8629,
at *21 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2013); Hodge v. Talkin, 949 F. Supp. 2d 152, 190 (D.D.C. 2013),
rev'd, 799 F-3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Marcavage v. City of Syracuse, No. 5 :12-CV-00761
(LEK/DEP), 2013 WL 3788569, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2013); Haw. Pac. Health v.
Takamine, Civil No. 11-007o6 SOM/KSC, 2013 WL 1858554, at *2-3 (D. Haw. May 1, 2013);
United Food & Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Bennett, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1194-95 (D.
Ariz. 2013); Yount v. Salazar, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1235 (D. Ariz. 2013); Congregation
Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, 915 F. Supp. 2d 574, 611 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Williams v. Puerto Rico, 910 F. Supp. 2d 386, 392 n-3 (D.P.R. 2012); Act Now To
Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 905 F. Supp. 2d 317, 353 (D.D.C.
2012); Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 720 (S.D. Miss. 2012);
Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep't of Health, No. 09-CV-3032-EFS, 2012 WL
2720874, at *4 (E.D. Wash. July 9, 2012). Even the NFIB joint dissenters themselves have
neglected the "Christmas-tree" principle. Since NFIB, those four Justices have joined a
majority opinion striking down part of a federal statute three times: in Executive Benefits
Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134
S. Ct. 1434 (2014); and Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). In none of those cases
did the Justices strike down an entire statute in light of the "Christmas-tree" principle.
7. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, loi
YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1452 (20o8); Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years ofChevron Teach Us
About the Rest ofStatutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 607, 623 (2014).
8. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-an
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part H1, 66 STAN. L.
REv. 725, 76o (2014).
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congressional staffer recently noted, "[I]f you care about regular order,
[omnibus legislation] gets very scary because it's a humongous deal negotiated
by people who really don't understand."9
Severability will continue to pose a dilemma for courts reviewing massive
statutes like the ACA. On the one hand, most omnibus statutes contain a large
number of constitutionally unproblematic provisions that a court could cleanly
sever from the unconstitutional provisions.xo On the other hand, severability
doctrine forbids courts from altering a statute in ways that conflict with the
intent of Congress." When deciding the severability of provisions in a long,
intricate piece of omnibus legislation, courts often lack reliable indicia of which
provisions Congress thought essential, and which provisions it would not
have enacted outside of the omnibus vehicle.
Courts have not yet grappled with this dilemma." The Supreme Court has
held numerous provisions in omnibus statutes unconstitutional. In these cases,
9. Id. at 761.
lo. At oral argument in the NFIB case, for example, Chief Justice Roberts stated: "[A] lot of
this is reauthorization of appropriations that have been reauthorized for the previous 5 or io
years and it was just more convenient for Congress to throw it in in the middle of the 2700
pages than to do it separately. I mean, can you really suggest -I mean, they've cited the
Black Lung Benefits Act and those have nothing to do with any of the things we are talking
about." Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-393).
ii. The NFIB dissenters correctly noted this aspect of severability doctrine. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
at 2668-69 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
12. This oversight should not come as a surprise. In general, severability doctrine has not
produced a quantity of scholarship or jurisprudential theory commensurate with its
importance. Although severability doctrine can have "profound consequences," it is usually
an "afterthought" for judges and scholars. John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 203, 204 & n.i (1993). And, as John Nagle notes, the Supreme Court's test for
severability was first stated in 1932. Id. at 204 & n.2 (citing Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp.
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932), overruled by Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S.
190 (1950)). This is still more or less correct, although recent cases have restated and
reshaped the test in significant ways. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508-to (2010); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S.
320, 328-31 (2006); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-49 (2005); see also Kenneth A.
Klukowski, Severability Doctrine: How Much of a Statute Should Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16
TEx. REv. L. & POL. 1, 53-54 (2011) (discussing the "modern test" of Free Enterprise Fund,
which reshaped the doctrine by making "functionality" analytically antecedent o an inquiry
into legislative intent and the legislative bargain). And, as Nagle noted, the seminal article
on severability was written in 1937. Nagle, supra, at 204 & n-3 (citing Robert L. Stem,
Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARv. L. REV. 76 (1937)). Robert
Stern's article is still authoritative. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S at 280 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part) (citing Stern's article as an influential authority on severability). Both of these events
occurred before the "age of statutes" and the modem administrative state. See generally
GUIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (describing the
transition from the common law into the "age of statutes"); ANNE M. KORNHAUSER,
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the Court rarely undertakes an express severability analysis; when it does
inquire into severability, it does not grant doctrinal significance to the omnibus
nature of the statute." For severability purposes, the Court treats omnibus
statutes the same as ordinary statutes.
Like the Court, the scholarly community has not yet addressed the unique
challenges of applying severability doctrine to omnibus statutes. Several
scholars who have written on severability have discussed omnibus statutes to
show why the doctrine must favor severability in at least some instances: in
their view, it would be absurd to strike down massive statutes containing a
hodgepodge of provisions because of a small constitutional defect in a single
provision.' Mark Movsesian and John Nagle go further, arguing that the
existence of omnibus bills shows that Congress generally intends for courts to
sever unconstitutional provisions from otherwise constitutional statutes."s In
contrast, scholars who attack the presumption of severability attempt to show
DEBATING THE AMERICAN STATE: LIBERAL ANXIETIES AND THE NEW LEVIATHAN, 1930-1970
(2015) (discussing the rise of the administrative state).
13. The NFIB dissenters claimed that "[t]he Court has not previously had occasion to consider
severability in the context of an omnibus enactment like the ACA, which includes not only
many provisions that are ancillary to its central provisions but also many that are entirely
unrelated." NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2675 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). This
claim is incorrect. Consider two recent opinions that the NFIB dissenters either wrote or
joined: Executive Benefits v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.
2594 (2011). Both cases concerned the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984. At no point in either Stern or Executive Benefits did the Court contemplate that
Congress's defective labeling of some claims as "core" threatened the constitutionality of the
entire Act. That Act was an omnibus measure that set up the current system of bankruptcy
courts, which handle millions of bankruptcy cases each year. See, e.g., Table F,
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts-Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, Terminated and Pending During the 12-
Month Periods Ending June 30, 2014 and 2015, U.S. CTS. (June 30, 2015), http://www
.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f/bankruptcy-filings/2o15/o6/3o [http://perma.cc/PPJ8-3SH6]
(showing at least one million bankruptcy cases terminated each twelve-month period).
Similarly, in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), the Court
considered the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. 5 441a(a)(3), a provision of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442. Both of these Acts contain many provisions unrelated to
5 441a(a)(3), which set aggregate limits on campaign donations. The Court did not raise the
issue of severability in its opinion.
14. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 370 (2007); Eric S. Fish,
Severability as Conditionality, 64 EMoRY L.J. 1293, 1314-15 (2015); Klukowski, supra note 12, at
91-92 (2011); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 780 n.197
(2010).
15. Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 8o-81 (1995);
Nagle, supra note 12, at 252 (1993).
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why total invalidation of an omnibus statute is unproblematic or unlikely to
occur.
This scholarship tends to assume that severability is a one-size-fits-all
doctrine, that a single approach to severability can serve all statutes.7 But the
literature on severability should not treat omnibus statutes as the bogeyman or
reductio ad absurdum of the severability debate. Instead, as this Note argues,
severability doctrine can and should be tailored to fit the unique features of
omnibus statutes. Omnibus statutes differ from paradigmatic single-purpose
legislation in important ways, and courts should take these differences into
account when assessing their severability.
After diagnosing the flaws of the current severability doctrine, this Note
proposes an alternative approach that would modernize severability doctrine
for the age of omnibus statutes. Part I describes the current severability
doctrine and explores the quandary that omnibus lawmaking poses for that
doctrine. Omnibus statutes differ from regular statutes in three important
ways, all with significance for severability doctrine. First, no single
congressional intent governs. Second, the provisions are not necessarily related
to or dependent on one another. Finally, judges often lack the capacity to
prevent spillover effects from findings of partial unconstitutionality.
Part II describes the potential legal bases for the three principles of current
severability doctrine: the severability-default principle, that courts should
generally only invalidate the unconstitutional portions of partially
unconstitutional statutes; the independent-remainder principle, that courts
must strike a partially unconstitutional statute down entirely if the remainder
is not "fully operative as a law" ;,8 and the hypothetical-passage principle, that
courts should strike the remainder down unless Congress would have passed it
on its own. It reasons that severability doctrine is either constitutional law or
federal common law. The distinction matters because courts can modify federal
W6. See Tom Campbell, Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495, 1518-19 (2011) ("It is not
true, as some commentators fear, that denying severability could put an entire complex
statute at risk, or even the entire U.S. Code. The bill that passed Congress or the legislature
containing the unconstitutional provision is all that would be at risk, leaving the code
section or chapter unharmed." (footnotes omitted)); Israel E. Friedman, Comment,
Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 919 (1997) ("Severability clauses, on
the other hand, do not enforce the legislative compromise; they protect the passage of
complex omnibus clauses.").
17. See, e.g., Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE
L.J. 2286, 2329-30 (2015) (describing the pitfalls of omnibus lawmaking to show why
statutory severability clauses (unlike administrative severability clauses) are a poor conveyor
of intent).
18. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 1o8 (1976)).
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common law for prudential reasons, but cannot change constitutional law as
easily. It then traces the history of severability doctrine to determine which of
the three principles are constitutional and which are federal common law. Two
rules are constitutionally required: the severability-default principle and the
independent-remainder principle. In contrast, the hypothetical-passage
principle is prudential and may be applied at courts' discretion.
Given this leeway to bypass the hypothetical-passage principle, the Note
argues that federal courts should employ a remedy developed by the German
Constitutional Court: the constitutional incompatibility option. Part III
introduces the concept of constitutional incompatibility and discusses its
advantages over the Court's current approach to deciding the severability of
omnibus legislation. When using the constitutional incompatibility option, the
Constitutional Court declares a statute unconstitutional, but enjoins the effect
of that declaration for a defined period of time. The grace period permits - but
does not require-the German legislature to revise the law to make it
constitutional. At the end of this period, in the event of legislative inaction, the
court voids the unconstitutional statute to the extent of its unconstitutionality.
The constitutional incompatibility option can serve the principles underlying
severability doctrine in cases involving omnibus statutes more faithfully and
effectively than the method currently used by American courts. Part IV
addresses possible objections to the use of the doctrine of constitutional
incompatibility in American law, and explores measures courts could take to
mitigate the problems raised by these objections.
The NFLB dissent signaled the need for scholarly discussion about the
severability of omnibus statutes. This dialogue must occur before another
"Christmas-tree" law faces the proverbial axe. This Note spearheads the
discussion in several ways. First, it develops the concerns about omnibus
statutes that motivated the fearful symmetry9 of the "Christmas-tree"
approach. Second, the Note homes in on the origins and contours of current
doctrine. Lastly, it proposes a doctrinal solution that respects the doctrine
while accounting for the idiosyncrasies of omnibus lawmaking.
19. Apologies to William Blake. WILIAM BLAKE, The Tyger, in SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND
EXPERIENCE 35 (London, William Blake 1794) ("Tyger, Tyger, burning bright ... What
immortal hand or eye, / Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?"). Like Blake's tiger, the
Christmas-tree approach is elegant, ruthless, and divinely inspired (insofar as it has no
origins in the Court's previous severability jurisprudence).
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1. OMNIBUS LAWMAKING AND SEVERABILITY
This Part articulates the jurisprudential problem motivating the Note.
Federal courts employ a relatively stable and well-developed approach to
severability: the Alaska Airlines doctrine. Certain characteristics of omnibus
bills, however, make the Alaska Airlines doctrine difficult to apply in cases
involving omnibus statutes.
A. An Introduction to Severability Doctrine
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock'o sets forth three principles governing federal
courts' approach to severability. Each principle ultimately derives from the
constitutional separation of the judicial and legislative powers. As the Federalist
Papers famously put it, the United States judiciary was meant to have "neither
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment."' Constitutionally weak, unelected
judges must defer to the lawmaking prerogative of elected representatives. The
Alaska Airlines doctrine manifests this separation of powers in three different
ways, in the form of three principles.'
The first principle is the presumption that "[a] court should refrain from
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary."' It must be evident that
Congress would have wanted an entire law struck down before a court may do
so. Without this evidence, courts might frustrate the legislative intent of the
people's representatives. The judiciary should, as a default, "maintain [an] act
[of Congress] insofar as it is valid,"' excising only the portions contrary to the
Constitution. This first principle creates a default rule of limited judicial
intervention. For ease of reference, this Note calls this rule the "severability-
default principle."
The second principle is that "Congress could not have intended a
constitutionally flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the
statute if the balance of the legislation is incapable of functioning
20. 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
22. Note that consensus does not exist as to the correct way to describe or categorize the Alaska
Airlines doctrine. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. Eric Fish, for example, sees an
additional "legislative intent" test in the Alaska Airlines opinion's language that the
remainder of a statute must "function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress."
Fish, supra note 14, at 1305 (quoting Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 68S). This Note uses the
same tripartite characterization of the Alaska Airlines doctrine as Justice O'Connor used in
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofNorthern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 327 (20o6).
23. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984)).
24. El Paso & Ne. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909).
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independently."s This principle represents a countervailing presumption that,
if the surviving portions of a partially unconstitutional statute are not "fully
operative as a law,"' the whole statute should be struck down. The second
principle acknowledges that, in some cases, respecting the balance of powers
means invalidating rump portions of legislation that Congress could not
possibly have meant to enact. This Note refers to this second rule as the
"independent-remainder principle."
The final principle is that "[an] unconstitutional provision must be severed
unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not
have enacted"' in other words, courts should inquire whether a severed statute
"will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress." The third
principle directs the judge to imagine what Congress would have done in her
shoes, faced with the choice of severing an unconstitutional provision or
invalidating an entire statute. If Congress would have passed the remainder on
its own, then it should stand. Otherwise, it should fall. For example, the
existence of a so-called "severability clause" is strong, but not conclusive,
evidence of Congress's intent. A severability clause, as its name suggests, is a
statutory provision that instructs courts on whether to sever unconstitutional
provisions from the remainder of the statute.9 If a statute contains a
severability clause, courts will generally follow the clause's command."o This
Note refers to this third rule as the "hypothetical-passage principle."
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board" illustrates
how these principles interact with each other in practice. In Free Enterprise
Fund, the Court examined the constitutionality of the statutory removal
procedure in place for members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB).' Both the Board members and their supervisors, the
25. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
26. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, io8 (1976)).
27. Id. at 685.
28. Id.
29. A severability clause usually takes the following form: "If any provision of this Act, or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act,
and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances, shall not be
affected thereby." Stern, supra note 12, at 115-16.
30. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686. But see Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924)
(stating that severability clauses are an "aid merely; not an inexorable command"); 2
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 44:8 (Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer
eds., 7th ed. 2009) ("Because of the frequency with which it is used, the separability clause
is regarded as little more than a mere formality.").
31. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
32. Id. at 486-87.
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Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission, were removable
only for neglect or malfeasance." The Court found that this double insulation
violated the President's power to "execute the laws."'
The Court's severability analysis incorporated all three Alaska Airlines
principles. The analysis started by recognizing the severability-default
principle, noting that "[g]enerally speaking, when confronting a constitutional
flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem, severing any
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact."3 The
unconstitutional removal procedures, the Court argued, were confined to two
minor provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; 6 following the severability-
default principle, the Court could limit its invalidation to those two
provisions.'
The Court next considered whether the independent remainder or
hypothetical passage principles foreclosed this solution, and concluded that
they did not. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act would remain "fully operative as a law"
without the problematic provisions; the rest of the law would function
essentially unchanged with those minor provisions removed. Furthermore, no
evidence existed that Congress, "faced with the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, would have preferred no Board at all to a Board whose members
are removable at will"; hence the remainder would have hypothetically passed
on its own. 8 The Court held the tenure provisions severable.
Free Enterprise Fund is a recent example of how the Court's doctrine
typically decides the severability of a statute. As the next Section of this Part
argues, this approach can run into problems when applied to omnibus statutes.
B. Problematic Features of Omnibus Lawmaking
Omnibus lawmaking depends on the use of one statutory vehicle -one
piece of proposed, debated, amended, and enacted legislation-to pass a
number of provisions. The legislative practice of bundling unrelated provisions
into single pieces of legislation is nothing new; it predates the Founding.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 496.
3s. Id. at 508 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328-29
(2006)).
36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2oo2, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
37. Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 509 ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act remains 'fully operative as a
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Colonial legislatures bundled provisions,39 and Congress adopted the practice.
As Larry Tribe and Phillip Kurland have noted, the first piece of appropriations
legislation passed by the First Congress included unrelated provisions.'o
Although Congress has always bundled provisions, for the first i5o years of
the Union bills tended to be relatively short and single purposed. Even during
the New Deal, when the scope of federal lawmaking expanded dramatically,
Congress did not pass bills anywhere near the size or complexity of the ACA."'
The practice of bundling has changed dramatically in recent decades.
Congress passed the first recognizably modern omnibus measure in 195o.'
The 1970s and 198os witnessed a dramatic increase in omnibus lawmaking.'
Indeed, from 1949 to 1994 the number of statutes passed by Congress each
session decreased by half- in part because of omnibus lawmaking's rise."
From 1948 to 2006, the average length of a bill increased from 2.5 pages to 15.2
pages. According to political scientist Glen Krutz, by the early 1990s
Congress was enacting sixteen percent of legislative provisions via omnibus
39. See J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and
Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 470-471 (1990) (acknowledging the colonial practice of
bundling legislation). Note that most states now have constitutional or statutory restrictions
on omnibus lawmaking. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. III, 5 23 ("No bill shall contain more than
one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title. . .").
40. Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., & Phillip B. Kurland,
Professor, Univ. of Chi., to Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senator (Oct. 31, 1989), in 135 CONG.
REc. S266o8-o9 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1989) (citing Louis Fisher, The Presidential Veto:
Constitutional Development, in PoRK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES: THE POLITICS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL VETO 22 (1988)).
41. The Social Security Act, for example, took up twenty-eight pages of the Statutes at Large.
Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). The ACA, by contrast,
consumed over nine hundred pages of the same publication. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Because the Statutes at Large
reporter has changed format in the intervening years, this comparison does not precisely
capture the difference in the two bills' lengths; still, it illustrates the relative size of a major
New Deal law as compared to today's megastatutes.
4z. GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS go (2001)
("(I]n 1950 ... the first omnibus bill [the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950] was put
together and passed.").
43. Id. at 56 fig.4.4, 100-01.
44. Id. at 55, 56 fig.4.3.
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measures. 6 Congress's increasing use of omnibus lawmaking has attracted
both criticism' and support.4
Omnibus laws differ from ordinary legislation both in form and in the
manner in which Congress passes them. Barbara Sinclair defines omnibus laws
as "[1]egislation that addresses numerous and not necessarily related subjects,
46. KRUTZ, supra note 42 at 58 tbl.4-3. To arrive at this figure, Krutz coded the provisions that
had "hitched a ride" on omnibus measures during these congressional sessions u ing the CQ
Almanac entries for legislation introduced during the sessions. Id. at 58.
47. The underlying normative debate about omnibus lawmaking undoubtedly has and will have
doctrinal consequences. Critics claim that omnibus vehicles reduce the quality of lawmaking
by sacrificing congressional involvement for the sake of efficiency. Provisions inserted in
omnibus measures receive less consideration in committee hearings and floor debate.
Members do not have as meaningful an opportunity to consider or amend provisions passed
through an omnibus measure. KRuTz, supra note 42, at 8, 36, 77-78, 141; Peter C. Hanson,
Abandoning the Regular Order: Majority Party Influence on Appropriations in the U.S. Senate, 67
POL. REs. Q 519, 522 (2014). Critics claim that this leads to formulaic, one-size-fits-all
lawmaking, ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32473 , OMNIBUs APPROPRIATIONS
ACTS: OVERVIEW OF RECENT PRACTICES 7 (20o8); encourages unsavory compromises and
logrolls; prevents input from lobbyists and the public, Loree Bykerk, Lobbying Unorthodox
Lawmaking, 83 INT'L Soc. SCL REv. 115 (2oo8); reduces members' accountability for the
policies they enact, KRUTZ, supra note 42, at 141; and hides controversial provisions in
massive, must-pass measures, id. at 2. A final criticism-one that has been particularly
trenchant in conservative circles - is that omnibus lawmaking disturbs the balance of power
between Congress and the President. This criticism was most influential during the debate
in the late 198os and 1990s over the line-item veto, and particularly the existence of an
"inherent" line-item veto power. The consensus that emerged was that omnibus lawmaking
is constitutional despite this effect on the balance of powers, if not normatively desirable.
See, e.g., Letter from Lawrence H. Tribe & Phillip B. Kurland to Edward M. Kennedy, supra
note 40 (laying out the case for the constitutionality of omnibus lawmaking and the
unconstitutionality of the inherent line-item veto). But see Sidak & Smith, supra note 39
(arguing that even though there is evidence that the Framers believed the legislative power
includes the power to bundle provisions into bills, the Framers could not have foreseen and
would not have approved of bundling on the scale of modern-day omnibus lawmaking); J.
Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Why Did President Bush Repudiate the "Inherent" Line-
Item Veto?, 9 J.L. & POL. 39, 51 (1992) (arguing that constitutional limits exist on the size of
bills because of the problem of congressional aggrandizement; for example, Congress could
not pass all of its legislative work for a session in a single omnibus vehicle).
48. Supporters point to the usefulness of omnibus bills in unclogging Congress's increasingly
Augean legislative machinery. Omnibus lawmaking is efficient. See generally Glen S. Krutz,
Getting Around Gridlock: The Effect of Omnibus Utilization on Legislative Productivity, 25 LEGIS.
STUD. Q 533 (2000) (providing empirical evidence that omnibus lawmaking does in fact
increase legislative productivity). It helps Congress get its work done, especially at the end
of a session. KRUTZ, supra note 42, at 9. In an era of gridlock and intransigence, it provides a
powerful tool for reaching compromise and enacting needed legislation. See Elizabeth
Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation: Applying the Lessons of Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation, 2002 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 2.
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issues, and programs, and therefore is usually highly complex and long." 9
Unlike most ordinary legislation, omnibus bills tend to be fast-tracked through
Congress or even bypass the committee and conference system entirely.s
Congressional leaders assemble the bills themselves and bring them to the floor
with little or no committee consideration.s9 The individual provisions of the
bills receive less debate than they would under ordinary lawmaking
procedures.s2 They almost always pass,s" and they tend to pass with large
bipartisan majorities.' Presidents generally do not veto them.5
Omnibus laws can be divided into two categories. The first includes laws
that legislate about a single subject or issue and yet are nonetheless long,
massive, and complex, containing many different policy prescriptions ("single-
subject" omnibus bills). Laws that address certain subjects tend to take an
omnibus form for two reasons: they are difficult policy areas in which to
legislate, and they tend not to fall under the jurisdiction of a single
committee. The ACA and the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1990 are
examples of this first type of omnibus bill.'
The second type of omnibus bill is important or must-pass legislation that
serves as a vehicle for a grab bag of provisions that have no unifying subject
area ("multisubject" omnibus bills). Appropriations bills and continuing
resolutions are the most common form of this second type of omnibus bill.
They are "must-pass" laws: without them the federal government would lose
authority to spend money and operate.s Glen Krutz has identified a few
49. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS 112 (4 th ed. 2011).
5o. See KRUTz, supra note 42, at 3. In orthodox lawmaking, congressional committees draft
legislation and refer it to the chamber as a whole; after both the House and Senate approve
versions of a bill, the chambers appoint a conference committee to iron out their differences.
Omnibus lawmaking sometimes bypasses these procedures: a small coterie of lawmakers
(typically involving the leadership) drafts and shepherds legislation through Congress
without relying on committees or conferences. See id. at 3-4.
si. See id. at 32.
52. See id. at 3.
53. See id. at 62.
54. See id. at 78; Hanson, supra note 47, at 529-30 tbl.3.
5s. See KRUTz, supra note 42, at 6-7.
s6. See id. at 81, 84 tbl.6.i, 85 (describing policy areas in which single-subject omnibus
lawmaking occurs).
57. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789.
58. Both the House and Senate have rules in place intended to prevent the inclusion of
legislative provisions in appropriations measures, but these rules are ineffective in practice;
significant portions of appropriations bills now consist of legislative provisions. ROBERT
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subject areas in which Congress tends to enact policy by grafting bills onto
must-pass omnibus legislation: health care, defense, macroeconomics, crime
and family issues, and foreign affairs.s" Policies in these areas "hitch a ride "o
on omnibus measures for a few reasons: they fall within the bailiwick of
multiple committees, they are traditionally dealt with as part of the budget
process, or they involve logrolls or earmarks that benefit individual members.1
Omnibus laws have characteristics that pose problems for severability
doctrine. First, the size and complexity of omnibus measures makes it difficult
to determine how closely related one measure is to the rest of the bill. This, in
turn, makes it difficult to apply the independent-remainder principle: a judge
faces obstacles measuring the bill's ability to function independently of an
unconstitutional provision. In a short, standalone bill, it is relatively easy to tell
how crucial a provision is to the bill's ability to effectuate its purpose. The
more moving parts a complex bill has, the harder it is for a judge to sort out the
machinery. Just how essential is the individual mandate to the ACA's program
of reforms? Presumably, this problem is more acute for single-subject omnibus
bills, which have many moving parts that are often related to each other. The
issue is attenuated for multisubject bills, in which the statutory parts are less
likely to be substantively interdependent. A multisubject bill's provisions are
typically thrown together for legislative convenience, not because one part of
the law relies upon or affects another.
Second, the process used to pass omnibus bills complicates the severability
analysis. As Elizabeth Garrett has noted, 6  and as Abbe Gluck and Lisa
Bressman have confirmed empirically, omnibus bills involve the "throwing
together" of legislation drafted in different committees.6' They are therefore
KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL3 o619, EXAMPLES OF LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS IN
OMNIBus APPROPRIATIONS ACTS 2-4 (20o8) (noting that the rules, House Rule XX= and
Senate Rule XVI, are ineffective because they are "not self-enforcing," they "may be
waived," and they are "not comprehensive in their coverage and application").
59. KRUTZ, supra note 42, at 59 tbl.4 .4 .
6o. Id. at 58.
61. Id. at 59-60. Policy grafted onto the second type of omnibus bill tends to be less radical or
large-scale than policy enacted through the first type of omnibus. If a policy change is
sufficiently high profile, conventional wisdom holds, members and the President will resist
burying the change in an unrelated omnibus measure, for fear of making major policy
decisions outside the normal lawmaking process and engendering public opposition. Id. at
111.
62. Garrett, supra note 48, at 6.
63. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-an Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 979
(2013); see Bressman & Gluck, supra note 8, at 757.
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seen as less "internally consistent" than single-subject bills,6 4 and come with
less organized, clear, and reliable legislative history.6 s While Gluck and
Bressman primarily use these findings to question the validity of judicial
presumptions of consistent usage,6 they are also relevant for the severability
inquiry.
One phenomenon illuminated by the findings is that omnibus bills tend
not to have a single set of authors or a single legislative purpose. The lack of a
single author makes it harder to apply the hypothetical-passage principle. How
integral did Congress think the unconstitutional provisions were to the rest of
the bill? Would Congress have passed the remainder of the bill without the
unconstitutional portions? If Congress included a severability clause, would it
have wanted the clause to apply to all provisions, no matter how critical? The
irregular, top-down legislative process used to pass omnibus bills creates holes
in the legislative history and makes these questions more difficult to answer.67
For example, if the process bypasses committee consideration of a bill, then
there will be no committee report explaining the meaning of the bill's
provisions; yet, as Bressman and Gluck's study indicates, committee reports
are justifiably considered among the most reliable sources of legislative
history.6 8 Just as the uncoordinated authorship of omnibus bills poses a unique
problem for statutory interpretation, it also complicates the severability
inquiry.
A related issue is that the provisions contained in omnibus measures are
less likely to have succeeded in standalone, up-or-down votes. As Elizabeth
Garrett notes:
Many of the separate policies included in an omnibus bill could not
have been enacted unless they had been part of this particular form of
legislation. Omnibus laws reflect delicate compromises that are either
impossible or more costly when bargaining must take place across bills
rather than within one proposal where all deals can be enacted
simultaneously.69
While this characterization might be too sweeping, it is true that legislative
bargaining is different for omnibus bills. Ordinary lawmaking requires
64. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 63, at 936.
65. See id. at 979.
66. See id. at 954-56.
67. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 8, at 761.
68. See id. at 741, 757, 760-62.
69. Garrett, supra note 48, at 3.
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substantive compromise: bridging gaps in policy preferences to reach
legislative outcomes that have majority support.' Omnibus lawmaking,
however, also depends heavily on procedural compromise: horse trading by
congressional eaders and members to decide which provisions will go into a
measure likely to pass.' Provisions that make it into omnibus bills need not
have widespread support on policy grounds.' Procedural bargaining is more
likely to occur in the process of drafting multisubject omnibus bills than single-
subject bills; it makes more strategic sense to try to place an ornament on a
must-pass Christmas tree.7'
Like the lack of unified legislative intent, the prevalence of procedural
bargaining makes it more difficult to apply the hypothetical-passage principle
of Alaska Airlines. Applying that principle often requires courts to isolate the
policy compromises that a congressional majority supported. For example, as
noted above, the Free Enterprise Fund Court decided that a majority in Congress
would have preferred a PCAOB with only one level of insulation from removal
over having no PCAOB at all.' But imagine that the double-insulation
provision was a pet project of a fence-sitting senator that the leadership had
inserted into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to achieve majority support.
Hypothetically, if that provision were removed, that senator might not have
voted for passage of the full Sarbanes-Oxley Act. That means that the
remainder of the law would not have passed without the double-insulation
provision, and the court would have to invalidate the entire law. Or maybe, if
push came to shove, the fence-sitting senator would have recognized the
absurdity of that position and abandoned her pet project, or the leadership
would have inserted another pet provision to mollify her. No straightforward,
neutral methodology allows a court to decide between these hypothetical
outcomes.
70. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, The Mindsets of Political Compromise, 8 PERSP. ON
POL. 1125, 1129-30 (2010) (defending the importance of compromise in successful democratic
lawmaking).
1. KRUTz, supra note 42, at 2.
72. Id. at 33-34.
73. The NFIB dissenters raised the bargaining issue with respect to the ACA, a bill that fits
more comfortably in the single-subject category. Query whether this was not a category
mistake on the part of the dissenters. The ACA's passage was anything but assured. Sheryl
Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with a Flourish, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.comi/20o/o3/24/health/policy/24health.html
[http://perma.cc/74QP-YJPY]. It did not have the "must-pass" status of a budget bill or
appropriations package. It was therefore not an ideal vehicle for pet projects or logrolls.
That the bill was not a must-pass measure makes it far less likely that the majority of
Congress that voted for the ACA disagreed substantively with the law's provisions.
74. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010).
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The final problem is that, even where it is possible for courts to determine
the relatedness of an omnibus bill's provisions and Congress's intent, the
process is costly. Omnibus bills are long; some have hundreds of provisions
and contain hundreds of thousands of words." Jurists have limited resources
and can ill afford to read through and understand these bills, provision by
provision, and decide what stays and what goes. Admittedly this danger, which
the NFIB dissenters also raise, is easy to exaggerate: it is typically not difficult
to tell, even from a table of contents, which parts of an omnibus bill are
relevant to a severability determination. The ACA's table, for example, lists
many provisions as "Miscellaneous."'6 Judges are not policy experts, however,
and it is possible to imagine situations in which the complexity and length of
omnibus measures would pose a special challenge to judicial resources. It is
also possible to imagine these logistical challenges leading to uncertainty about
which parts of the law still stand after a judicial decision. Such uncertainty
produces social costs, including mistakes, detrimental reliance, and chilling
effects.
Omnibus statutes are not ordinary statutes, and courts should not treat
them as ordinary statutes for purposes of severability doctrine. A
straightforward application of the Alaska Airlines doctrine will fail to appreciate
the unusual features of omnibus lawmaking and may place disproportionate
burdens on the judicial branch. A new approach is needed.
II. THE PEDIGREE OF SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE
Can severability doctrine adapt to address the unique challenges posed by
omnibus statutes? This Part establishes a methodology for exploring whether
any room for flexibility exists in the current doctrine. It then uses that
methodology to determine whether the principles of severability are
constitutionally required or prudential.
7s. The 200s Transportation Bill, for example, includes over four hundred provisions. See
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub.
L. No. 109-59, § i(b), 119 Stat. 144, 1144-3 (2005); see also Glenn Thrush, GOP Wrote 5 of
lo Longest Bills, PouTIco (Nov. 25, 2009, 11:47 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/on
-congress/2oo9/ii/gop-wrote-5-of-io-longest-bills-023067 [http://perma.cc/GT8H-D4ZV]
(listing the longest bills as of 20o9 by word count).
76. Edward G. Grossman, Compilation of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, OFF. LEGIS.
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The three Alaska Airlines severability principles are now well established.7
It is less clear, however, from what source of authority they are derived. Are
they judge-made, common-law principles? Constitutional principles? What
freedom do courts have to change them? Judges have traditionally shied away
from answering these questions; they apply severability doctrine, theirs not to
reason why.8 Severability doctrine will grow in importance, however, as courts
find portions of Congress's increasingly prevalent omnibus legislation
unconstitutional. It is essential to determine the sources of the doctrine and
what freedom of action, if any, the federal judiciary has to modify the doctrine
for omnibus legislation.
A. The Stakes of Determining Severability Doctrine's Source
Scholarly consensus holds that a legal doctrine can belong to a limited
number of types of law: state law, federal statutory law, international law,
"general [common] law," federal common law, and constitutional law.' For
severability doctrine, we can easily rule out the first four types of law listed.So
77. Although not every application of severability doctrine acknowledges or gives equal weight
to all three Alaska Airlines principles or reproduces them accurately, they are widely
recognized as the prevailing test for severability. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328-31 (2oo6); United States v. Booker, S43 U.S. 220, 258-59
(2005); Nagle, supra note 12, at 205; Rachel J. Ezzell, Note, Statutory Interdependence in
Severability Analysis, 111 MICH. L. REv. 1481, 1484-85 (2013) ("The Supreme Court set forth
its modern severability framework in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock.").
78. Bd. of Nat. Res. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947 (9 th Cit. 1993) ("The test for severability has
been stated often but rarely explained."); Nagle, supra note 12, at 205; A. Michael Froomkin,
Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal Process, 66 TEx. L. REV.
1071, 1092 (1988) (book review) ("To this day, the Court has never offered a constitutionally
satisfactory explanation of its severability decisions."). Alaska Airlines cobbled its three
principles together from previous cases without spending any time providing
jurisprudential justification for why they constitute the correct test for severability. Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (calling the test for severability "well
established" and declining to provide further insight into its origins). Justice O'Connor
came closer to justifying them in her opinion for the Court in Ayotte. 546 U.S. at 328-31.
Even in Ayotte, however, the analysis is still relatively cursory. It provides a couple of first
principles that inform severability doctrine (e.g., "[g]enerally speaking, when confronting a
constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem") and then
restates the three Alaska Airlines principles in a bit more depth. Id. at 328.
7g. Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of
Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 753, 771 (2013).
so. Federal severability doctrine is not state law. States each have their own severability
doctrines that are not the same as the doctrine that governs the severability of federal
statutes. See, e.g., Cal. Tow Truck Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 797 F.3d 733,
755 (9 th Cir. 2015) (applying California state severability doctrine). Severability doctrine is
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We are therefore left with two possibilities: severability doctrine is federal
common law or it is constitutional law.
This Note teases out whether severability doctrine is federal common law
or constitutional law for one simple reason: constitutional principles place
also not federal statutory law. Although statutory evidence of congressional intent is taken
seriously in the federal courts' severability doctrine, there exists no general statute governing
the severability question. Severability doctrine also does not belong to the pre-Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins category of "general common law"; post-Erie, that is no longer a viable
category. Gluck, supra note 79, at 773 n.72. But see Ryan Scoville, The New General Common
Law of Severability, 91 TEx. L. REv. 543 (2013) (arguing that, after Ayotte, severability doctrine
is in fact general common law of the type whose existence Erie denies). Finally, severability
doctrine is clearly not international law.
S. Another type of law that should be considered is the set of judge-made rules that courts have
developed to govern their decision making. Among these are rules of statutory
interpretation and rules about the internal procedures of courts (such as how many votes are
necessary to decide a case). These rules typically do not fit the two categories of the Supreme
Court's definition of federal common law: they have no bearing on federalism interests and
Congress has not licensed the federal courts to create them. See infra notes 88-89 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, Congress's power to legislate about and override these
rules is contested. The Supreme Court has indicated that some rules related to judicial
decision making may be overridden. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135
S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time
Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REv. 761, 766 (1997). Even so, some scholars and at
least one state court believe that the Constitution confers the sole power to make some
rules-rules of statutory interpretation, for example-on the judiciary. According to this
view, a congressional enactment that directs courts how to interpret statutes violates their
interpretive prerogative and is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna
Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 97, 99-100 (2003); Linda D. Jellum, "Which Is To Be Master," the
Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation ofPowers, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 837, 842 (2009); Ryan, supra, at 775-76, 787, 799-800 (describing an inherent power of
the judiciary to preserve its unique role of "render[ing] 'dispositive judgments' in particular
cases and controversies," meaning that Congress may not interfere with courts' "deliberative
functions" (citations omitted)). But see, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of
Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REv. 743,
768 (1992) (arguing that Congress has the power to direct the interpretation of federal
statutes).
However we understand this special category of rules, severability doctrine does not
belong within it. Severability is not part of the core powers and functions that these rules
serve. Severability is related to judicial decision making in an abstract sense, because courts
announce severability decisions in the opinions that they issue after deciding a case. But in
every situation where severability is relevant, the court's finding of partial
unconstitutionality decided the case. Severability is not like a rule of statutory interpretation,
which affects how a court applies the law to a particular case. It is also not a "remedy,"
properly understood, because it does not affect the legal rights and obligations of the parties
before the court. It is a prospective announcement of the state of the law in the wake of the
finding of partial unconstitutionality. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
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greater constraints on judges." Constitutional law involves a special mode of
interpretation. Constitutional principles are supposed to be fundamental and
fixed, products of courts discovering "what the law is"8' rather than judicial
manufacture.' Once a judge interprets a constitutional provision, there should
be a heavy presumption against changing that interpretation. The formulation
of federal common law, on the other hand, involves a greater degree of judicial
freedom. When making federal common law, judges respect constitutional
principles -federal common law, after all, may not violate the Constitutions -
but they also take into account prudential concerns and common-sense
judgments in a manner that would be controversial if used in constitutional
law.
Furthermore, constitutional principles bind judges in a way that federal
common law does not. True, federal common law is binding under the
doctrine of stare decisis. Because the application of federal common law
principles depends on prudential considerations, however, judges can
distinguish or disregard them when prudential considerations so dictate.
Constitutional principles, on the other hand, are unaffected by prudential
concerns. The Constitution binds absolutely.6
82. As this Part later discusses, federal common law also differs from constitutional law in that
most (if not all) federal common law may be overridden by an act of Congress, whereas
constitutional principles cannot be. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. This
distinction is irrelevant to the argument of this Note-it does not discuss a potential
legislative solution to the problem of applying severability doctrine to omnibus statutes-
but it could matter if such a solution were proposed.
83. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
84. This distinction comports with the "declaratory theory of law" that Justice Scalia (among
others) has espoused. David Lehn, Adjudicative Retroactivity as a Preclusion Problem: Dow
Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, S9 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 563, 574-75 (2004); see also James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("'[T]he
judicial Power of the United States' conferred upon this Court and such inferior courts as
Congress may establish, Art. III, 5 1, must be deemed to be the judicial power as understood
by our common-law tradition. That is the power 'to say what the law is,' not the power to
change it. I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges
in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they
were 'finding' it -discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed
to, or what it will tomorrow be." (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). According to
this theory, "[a] change in [constitutional] law is really a correction: the previous statement
of law simply resulted from 'a failure at true discovery'; the 'old' law was 'never the law."'
Lehn, supra, at 574 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 (1965)). The Court has
adopted a version of this theory. See Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97
(1993).
8s. See Hanna v. Plumer, 38o U.S. 460,471-72 (1965).
86. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 138 ("The courts of the U. States are bound to take notice
of the constitution."). Of course, one could make the realist objection that, when push
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B. How To Determine the Source ofSeverability Principles
The biggest barrier to determining whether severability doctrine
constitutes federal common law or constitutional law is that whereas
constitutional law is relatively easy to define-legal rules and principles
emanating from judges' interpretation of the Constitution- federal common
law does not have a single, generally accepted definition. This Section first
introduces two competing definitions of federal common law, one more
restrictive than the other. It then describes a methodology for determining
whether severability doctrine is federal common law or constitutional law: one
must examine how tightly related the rules of severability are to the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court currently favors a restrictive understanding of federal
common law. As the Court stated in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc.:
[This] Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited
areas to formulate what has come to be known as "federal common
law." These instances are "few and restricted," and fall into essentially
two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is "necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests," and those in which Congress has
given the courts the power to develop substantive law.8
This definition tells us three things about federal common law. First, federal
common lawmaking occurs in only two defined categories. One category -the
protection of "uniquely federal interests" -is what most people likely have in
mind when discussing federal common law. It includes doctrines such as the
one articulated in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., which gives federal
contractors immunity from state-law tort liability.88 The other category applies
to situations where statutes implicitly or explicitly authorize courts to fill in
substantive gaps. In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama, for instance, the Supreme Court found that Congress had licensed
comes to shove, a federal court could change a principle of constitutional law as easily as a
federal common law rule. Perhaps it is "naive" to suppose that there are any meaningful
limits on judges' flexibility to alter rules of constitutional law. See James M. Beam, 501 U.S.
at 548-49. Insofar as the Court respects the distinction between courts' ability to alter one
versus the other, see sources cited supra note 84, this Note respects it as well.
87. 451 U.S. 63o, 640 (1981) (citations omitted); see also HenryJ. Friendly, In Praise ofErie-and
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 405, 407 (1964) (providing similar
definitions).
88. 487 U.S. SOO, 504 (1988).
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the federal courts to fill in the gaps of federal labor law.89 Second, courts
cannot create federal common law in substantive areas where Congress would
not have the power to legislate.9 o Principles of federalism constrain the federal
courts' power to make federal common law. Third, Congress always has the
power to override federal common law.' Congressional egislation trumps and
displaces the common-law rules that federal judges create.
Severability doctrine cannot fall under the Supreme Court's definition of
federal common law. Due to a lack of conclusive constitutional or historical
evidence (or scholarly consensus), it is unclear to what extent Congress may
legislate in the field of severability92 or override judge-made severability
doctrine.93 It is evident, however, that severability doctrine does not belong in
either of the two categories of federal common law recognized by the Court.
The first category, rules of decision that protect uniquely federal interests,
arises only when federalism concerns are at stake." Federalism concerns are
irrelevant for severability doctrine because it only applies to the federal courts
and federal statutes; it cannot have an effect on the balance of power between
state and federal law. The second category, in which courts are licensed to fill
in the interstices of federal legislation, is inapplicable to severability doctrine
because Congress has never attempted to legislate general rules of severability
that apply across statutes." Severability doctrine is not interstitial lawmaking
authorized by Congress.
89. 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
go. See 3 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 6:15 (3d ed. 2015); Martha A. Field, Sources of
Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 927 (1986) (describing the
Supreme Court's understanding of the scope of federal common law); Thomas E. Plank,
The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 633, 643 (2004).
g9. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) ("We have always recognized that
federal common law is 'subject to the paramount authority of Congress."' (quoting New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931))).
92. Congress arguably legislates about severability when it includes so-called "severability
clauses" in statutes. Courts do not always treat these clauses as binding, however, so it is
hard to say that such clauses are evidence that Congress can make law in the area of
severability. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924) (stating that severability clauses
are an "aid merely; not an inexorable command").
93. To the author's knowledge, this question has never been litigated, and Congress has never
attempted to override the Court's severability doctrine.
94. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-28 (1979) (basing the Court's
power to create federal common law on the balance of federal and state interests);
Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Powers That Be: A Reexamination of the Federal Courts'
Rulemaking and Adjudicatory Powers in the Context of a Clash of a Congressional Statute and a
Supreme Court Rule, 57 BAYLOR L. REv. 587, 668 (2005).
9s. Note, however, that Congress regularly writes severability clauses into statutes. See infra
notes 229-232 and accompanying text. Individual severability clauses are a different beast
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If severability doctrine does not fit within the Supreme Court's definition,
can it still constitute federal common law? The answer is yes-possibly.
Scholars have long recognized that federal courts create common-law-like rules
outside of these categories.'' They have consequently developed definitions of
federal common law that are more expansive than the Court's current version.
Martha Field elaborated one of the most expansive understandings in a 1986
article, defining "federal common law" as "any rule of federal law created by a
court . . . when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal
enactments-constitutional or congressional."9 7 In other words, every time a
court creates a federal rule that is not tied sufficiently tightly to the
Constitution or a federal statute- including when a rule interprets but is not
necessarily required by either of them-it creates federal common law.98
Because Field's definition is among the broadest available, severability doctrine
must at least satisfy Field's criteria, or else federal common law must be
eliminated as a possible source of law.
Using Field's definition, the line between constitutional law and common
law can be drawn by examining how directly the rules are taken from the
Constitution. Is this a situation in which the Constitution -interpreted as the
Constitution is generally interpreted -dictates the rules that the federal courts
apply? If so, then it is constitutional law. Or is it a situation where the rules are
the prudential outcropping of federal courts' need to make their powers to
determine the law and remedy disputes effective in practice? If this is the case,
then it is federal common law.
To illustrate the distinction, consider the category of legal rules and
principles that Henry Monaghan called "constitutional common law."99
from general severability rules because they are generally interpreted under the Alaska
Airlines framework as mere expressions of the intent of Congress rather than positive law-
an understanding corroborated by the Supreme Court's declaration that severability clauses
are not dispositive of the severability of statutes, Dorchy, 264 U.S. at 290, which they would
have to be if they were positive law.
96. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 616-26 (6th ed. 2009) (describing several conceptualizations of federal
common law).
97. Field, supra note 90, at 890.
go. According to Field, the federal courts' power to create federal common law should be
constrained by two principles. First, courts need to have a source of authority for the rules
they create: they have to derive the authority to create rules from the Constitution or a
statute. Id. at 935. Second, federal common law cannot violate federalism: judge-made
federal rules cannot unduly intrude upon the states. Id. at 888. These principles keep judge-
made law in check.
99. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 14 (1975).
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Constitutional common law comprises the rules and principles that federal
courts develop to make judicial review effective. Examples include the
exclusionary-rule remedy of Mapp v. Ohio' and the damages remedy of Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 'o' Under the
exclusionary rule, the government may not admit evidence gathered during an
unconstitutional search or seizure in a criminal trial. When granting a Bivens
remedy, courts award amages to persons whose constitutional rights were
violated. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that neither of these remedies
flows directly from the Constitution; instead, they were "judicially created" to
give effect to constitutional rights by deterring unlawful police conduct.o2
Monaghan analogized these rules to normal federal common law. Most
federal common law fills gaps in federal statutes in light of their text, structure,
and purpose. Constitutional common law does the same, but the Constitution is
the relevant federal law."o3 When there are gaps in the Constitution's ability to
regulate the government's powers, the federal courts fashion rules to give effect
to the Constitution. They appear to be creatures of constitutional law, but they
are not: they are federal common law. Why? Because the rules do not derive
directly from the Constitution, and the Constitution does not require them;
they are prudential judicial creations. The Court in Bivens determined that some
scheme of relief needed to exist for certain constitutional violations, and so it
made one "in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."' Consequently,
courts have greater leeway in applying the principle of Bivens than they would a
rule of constitutional law: if Congress establishes an adequate r medial scheme
for a constitutional violation, then courts need not fashion a Bivens remedy.'os
This flexibility is what separates constitutional law from federal common law-
and it is this same flexibility that determines whether severability doctrine can
be modified to accommodate omnibus statutes.
100. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
101. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
ic2. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.").
103. Monaghan, supra note 99, at 14.
104. 403 U.S. at 395-96.
1os. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (stating that "victims of a constitutional
violation" do not have the right to a Bivens remedy if "Congress has provided an alternative
remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and [is] viewed as equally effective").
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C. Determining Which Aspects of Severability Doctrine Are Constitutionally
Required
To figure out whether the Alaska Airlines principles are constitutional law
or common law, this Section of the Note engages with the history of
severability doctrine. It looks at two constitutional provisions that have shaped
the Alaska Airlines standard: Article III's conferral of the "judicial Power" on
the federal courts, and Article I, Section 7's requirement that statutory "Law"
pass through the bicameralism and presentment procedures. It concludes that
the first two elements of the Alaska Airlines standard - the severability default
and independent remainder principles-are constitutionally required. The
hypothetical-passage principle, however, is a prudential federal common law
requirement that courts may overlook in appropriate situations.
The literature has so far not sought to discover whether any portions of
severability doctrine are constitutionally required.o6 Aside from brief mentions
of severability's role in Marbuty v. Madison, the literature on American
severability doctrine has either neglected or misunderstood the doctrine's
roots. o 7 In fact, two recent articles make the profoundly erroneous claim that
the doctrine originated in the nineteenth-century application of contract-law
principles to judicial review.io8 Others claim that there was no severability
doctrine in the Founding Era, and therefore no constitutional foundation for
1o6. The approach this Note takes is agnostic as to the correct focus of constitutional
interpretation. It does not mean to or need to argue that the original understanding of
severability ought to be the sole determinant of courts' behavior, because it posits it as
consistent with the modern approach to severability.
107. See, e.g., Tobias A. Dorsey, Sense and Severability, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 877, 886-87 (2012)
(tracing severability back to Marbury); Fish, supra note 14, at 1301 (beginning with Marbury);
David H. Gans, Severability as judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 639, 661 (2oo8)
(same); Klukowski, supra note 12, at ii ("The doctrine governing severability in American
statutory interpretation finds its roots in the nineteenth century."); Nagle, supra note 12, at
212 (beginning with Marbury) ; Lars Noah, The Executive Line Item Veto and the Judicial Power
To Sever: What's the Diference?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 235, 236 n.8 (1999) (tracing
severability back to Marbury) ; Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of
Law, 41 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 232 (2004) (same). But see Walsh, supra note 14, at 756
(discussing the possibility of tracing the origins of severability to The Federalist No. 78).
1o8. Movsesian, supra note 15, at 43 (1995) ("Since the mid-nineteenth century, when they began to
address the question seriously, courts have analyzed the severability of statutory provisions
under a contracts approach. That is, in determining the severability of unconstitutional
statutory provisions, courts have applied essentially the same test they employ to determine
the severability of illegal contract terms." (emphasis added)); see also Campbell, supra note
16, at 15o8 (2011) ("Severability has its genesis in thecommon law of contracts. . . .").
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severability doctrine.'0 A review of the relevant history, however,
demonstrates that severability doctrine is as old as judicial review itself.
This Section uses this history to identify whether the Alaska Airlines
principles are constitutional law or federal common law. It reaches the
following conclusions: the severability-default principle -that the Constitution
invalidates only the unconstitutional portions of a partially unconstitutional
statute - derives from the original understanding of Article III courts' power of
judicial review. It is therefore a constitutional-law principle. The independent-
remainder principle- that a statute is inseverable if its remaining portions are
not fully operative as a law- stems from the separation-of-powers principle of
Article I, Section 7. It is also a principle of constitutional law. In contrast, the
hypothetical-passage principle -that a statute is inseverable if Congress would
not have passed the remainder on its own-does not derive from any
constitutional provision and is not constitutionally required. It is therefore a
creature of federal common law.
i. The Severability-Default Principle: Locating Severability Doctrine in
Article III Limits on the Judicial Power
The first principle of the Alaska Airlines doctrine, the severability-default
principle, is a presumption that courts should invalidate only the statutory
provisions that conflict with the Constitution. As explained below, this
principle was drawn directly from the Founding-Era understanding of the
limits of judicial review. Federal courts, in other words, have always thought
this principle to be constitutionally required. It is therefore a creature of
constitutional law.
This Section explores the original understanding of federal courts' Article
III power to "say what the law is,""o and in particular the original conception
of the constraints on judges' power to strike down federal statutes. In both
theory and practice, the Constitution has always been understood to require a
default rule of severability. The Note uses four types of sources to make this
historical claim: state-court cases decided prior to the Constitutional
Convention, which demonstrate the American judiciary's initial severability
practices; statements in The Federalist Papers, which reflect the Founding-Era
iog. See Walsh, supra note 14, at 769 ("[T]he identification of partial unconstitutionality as a
problem for analysis in its own right did not occur until after the modern intent-based
approach to severability emerged."); Mary C. Aretha, Comment, Scanning the Horizon: The
Supreme Court's Severability Analysis Post-National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv. 853, 858 ("The Constitution does not speak to the issue of
severability.").
iio. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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understanding of the metes and bounds of Article III judicial review; the post-
ratification practices of the Supreme Court, which confirm the purchase of that
understanding; and recent Supreme Court cases, which affirm its longevity.
Pre-1787 state court judicial review provides the earliest possible source of
insight into the original understanding of severability."' On at least eight
occasions from 1778 to 1787, state courts invalidated or refused to enforce acts
of the state legislatures on constitutional grounds."' Two of these cases- both
testing the constitutionality of statutes with more than one provision- provide
insight into how courts of the Founding Era treated partially unconstitutional
laws. As these cases indicate, Founding-Era judges presumed that courts
should only invalidate laws to the extent of their unconstitutionality- a
presumption later incorporated into the original understanding of Article III.
The first case to illustrate this presumption of severability was the New
Jersey case of Holmes v. Walton."3 The case involved a challenge to an act
passed during the Revolutionary War that authorized patriots to seize loyalist
goods if the owner of the goods intended to transfer them to the British."' The
law allowed juries of fewer than twelve persons to determine the legality of
seizures.' In September 1780, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that
trying seizure cases with juries of fewer than twelve persons violated the
New Jersey Constitution."6
The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding did not invalidate the entire
seizure statute, illustrating that it considered severability to be the default
remedy for partial unconstitutionality. Prior to deciding Holmes, the judges of
the court sent a letter to the New Jersey legislature. The letter expressed their
concerns about the effect of their impending decision on the state's war efforts
and recommended that the legislature clarify what would happen if the jury
Ill. 1787 was, of course, the year of the Constitutional Convention. Unlike many constitutional
doctrines, the constitutional history relevant for the Article III analysis does not date back
to English law. 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 941-42 (1953). Judicial review was a novel American
experiment that departed from English precedent. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 292(1969).
12. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins ofjudicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REv.
887, 933-34 (2003). But see 2 CROSSKEY, supra note III, at 974 (denying that these eight cases,
as well as an "undiscovered" 1788 Massachusetts case, were clear examples of the right of
judicial review).
113. Austin Scott, Holmes vs. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent: A Chapter in the History offudicial
Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, 4 AM. HIST. REv. 456 (1899) (describing Holmes v.
Walton).
114. Id. at 456-57.
1s. Id.
ui. Id. at 463.
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provision were declared unconstitutional.n7 In June 1780, as a result of this
letter, the legislature passed a law indicating that courts had the power to
retry cases found defective on constitutional grounds on the merits, instead
of automatically dismissing them."8 Loyalists who violated the substantive
prohibitions of the Seizure Act did not win their property back by default on
account of the Act's partial constitutional infirmity."' According to a
nineteenth-century New Jersey historian, the outcome of the Holmes case stood
for the principle that "a law is no law only so far as it is in exact conflict with
the constitution; that all its other provisions if possible must stand."2 o
The same principle of default severability appeared in the New York case of
Rutgers v. Waddington.'2 The defendant in that case, represented by Alexander
Hamilton, argued that the state's Trespass Act violated the recently concluded
peace treaty with Britain and the law of nations.' The Act provided a right of
action to nonloyalists for property damaged during the British occupation.'3 It
disallowed defendants from raising the customary defense of justified trespass
due to military orders and authorization, in effect creating a strict liability
regime for property claims arising out of the war.'" The New York
legislature had passed the statute before news of the peace treaty reached its
members.2 s Hamilton argued that, in light of the peace treaty's implied general
amnesty for all injuries stemming from the war, and its supremacy over acts of
the legislature, the court ought to construe the act so as to exclude foreign
(specifically British) subjects from its purview."2
Although the New York Court of Common Pleas rejected Hamilton's
argument that the statute violated any explicit provision of the peace treaty,'"7 it
held that British subjects and anyone else "clearly exempted from the operation of
this statute by the law of nations . . . could never have been intended to be
117. Id. at 462.
118. Id. at 462-63.
11g. Id.
120. Id. at 463.
12i. 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DoCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 296 (Julius
Goebel, Jr. ed.,1964).
122. Id.
123. see THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS VERSUS JOSHUA WADDINGTON, DETERMINED IN THE
MAYOR'S COURT, IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, AUGUST 7, 1786, WITH AN HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION BY HENRY B. DAWSON, atxii-xv (Morrisania, Bradstreet Press 1866).
124. Id.
125. 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 121, at 288.
126. Id. at 388.
127. Id. at 417.
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comprehended within it by the Legislature.""" The effect of the court's
decision was to void the applicability of the Trespass Act only to the extent that it
conflicted with a variety of higher law: the law of nations. The court presumed
that the default remedy for the conflict was severance.' 9
Holmes and Rutgers, decided in the years leading up to the Constitutional
Convention, help establish the original understanding of courts' powers to
invalidate unconstitutional statutory provisions. Holmes and Rutgers were well-
known state court cases that influenced the Founders' conception of how
judicial review should function.3o As these cases indicate, early American
jurists thought it natural that courts engaging in judicial review would
invalidate partially unconstitutional laws only to the extent of their
unconstitutionality, excising unconstitutional provisions while continuing to
enforce the remainder. Records of the Philadelphia Convention and the
ratification debates contain no discussion of how judicial review would
function in cases involving partially unconstitutional statutes. Several speakers,
128. Id. at 418.
129. The third state case, the 1786 Rhode Island case Trevett v. Weeden, does not evidence an
alternative understanding of severability. See JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE TREVETT
AGAINST WEEDEN: ON INFORMATION AND COMPLAINT FOR REFUSING PAPER BILLS IN
PAYMENT FOR BUTCHER'S MEAT IN MARKET, AT PAR WITH SPECIE, TRIED BEFORE THE
HONOURABLE SUPERIOR COURT IN THE COUNTY OF NEWPORT, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1786
(Providence, John Carter 1787). The facts of Trevett made severability irrelevant. In Trevett,
the Rhode Island Superior Court of Judicature dismissed a criminal case in which a
defendant was charged with violating the state's "paper-money laws" by refusing to accept
paper bills as legal tender. 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 1u, at 965-67. When the legislature
asked members of the court to explain their action, they stated that they refused to
"execute" a recent act of the legislature that had changed the procedure for prosecuting
violations of the paper-money laws. The Act had eliminated trial by jury, gotten rid of the
right of appeal, and amended the penalties for violating the laws. The judges' rationale was
that the Act's denial of the right to a jury trial contravened Rhode Island's colonial
charter. Id.; VARNUM, supra, at 1-2. The judges of the Superior Court of Judicature did
not declare the act unconstitutional outright. J. HAMPDEN DOUGHERTY, POWER OF
FEDERAL JUDICIARY OVER LEGISLATION: ITS ORIGIN; THE POWER To SET ASIDE LAws;
BOUNDARIES OF THE POWER; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE; EXISTING EvILs AND REMEDIES 30
(1912). By dismissing the case, however, the court arguably refused to enforce a partially
unconstitutional statute on account of one unconstitutional provision. The Rhode Island
legislature did not follow the example of New Jersey in Holmes and allow retrial on the merits;
instead, it removed all but one of the judges from office at the next available opportunity.
Id. at 31. The continuing legitimacy of the penalty and right to appeal provisions of the
impugned Act were never decided, however, because no prosecutions proceeded to trial.
13o. DOUGHERTY, supra note 129, at 22-23 (discussing the influence of Rutgers on the Founders);
WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MEIGS, THE RELATION OF THE JUDICIARY TO THE CONSTITUTION 135-
38 (1919) (noting that at least four members of the New Jersey delegation to the
Constitutional Convention were familiar with Holmes and arguing that they incorporated its
principle of judicial review into what became the Supremacy Clause).
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however, cited the state courts' practice of judicial review as a model for the
federal judiciary.' One can infer that members of the Founding generation
approved of the judges' severability practices in those cases or that, even if
they held no opinion about those practices, these cases normalized the
severability-default principle in their eyes.
Subsequent Founding-Era writings and cases support this inference. In The
Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton-who had argued Rutgers- explicitly
anticipated that federal judges would apply the severability practices of Rutgers
and Holmes:
A constitution is . . . fundamental law. It therefore belongs to
[courts] to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two . . . the
Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute ....
This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between two
contradictory laws is exemplified in a familiar instance. It not
uncommonly happens that there are two statutes existing at one time,
clashing in whole or in part with each other . ... So far as they can, by
any fair construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law
conspire to dictate that this should be done; where this is impracticable,
it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one, in exclusion of the
other ....
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a
[constitutional] repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the
constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen
in the case of two contradictory statutes . . . .
131. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787,
at 196 (William S. Hein 1996) (1891) (comments of Oliver Ellsworth); 3 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, supra, at 299
(comments of Edmund Pendleton); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 28
(Max Farrand ed., 1966) (comments ofJames Madison).
132. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 21, at 466-67 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Hamilton argued to the ratifying public that the Constitution would not be
a cudgel that willful judges"' could wield to strike down congressional
enactments with which they disagreed. He portrayed judicial review as a
characteristically judicial - and therefore less threatening - enterprise,
comparing it to the more familiar judicial task of reconciling two conflicting
statutes. Hamilton promised that, under the proposed Constitution, federal
courts would treat partially unconstitutional statutes as they would two
conflicting laws, invalidating unconstitutional statutes to the extent that they
contradicted the Constitution while continuing to enforce the nonconflicting
remainder.'* He (and the ratifying public) presumably expected that federal
courts would follow the example of the New York Court of Common Pleas in
Rutgers.
The early practice of the Supreme Court conformed to Hamilton's
expectations. United States v. Todd' is believed to be the first Supreme Court
case to present a question of the constitutionality of a statute and, more
importantly, the first case in which the Court invalidated an act of Congress. ,6
The Court decided Todd five years after the Constitution came into force; it is
perhaps our best available indication of the Founding-Era understanding of the
constitutional limits on judges' power to strike down partially unconstitutional
statutes.
The facts of Todd are similar to those of the better-known Hayburn's
Case."' A 1792 Act of Congresse8 assigned federal-circuit judges a role in
determining the eligibility of Revolutionary War veterans for federal pensions.
Under the Act, the circuit judges' decisions about eligibility were subject to
review by the Secretary of the Treasury and, potentially, by Congress itself.1 9
Judges were initially reluctant to perform this function because of two
separation-of-powers concerns: first, that the role was not judicial in nature;
and second, that executive officials and Congress should not have the power to
133. See id. at 464 (" [The judicial branch] may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but
merely judgment.").
134. Walsh, supra note 14, at 756.
135. See United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52 (1851) (Note by the Chief Justice,
Inserted by the Order of the Court) (summarizing United States v. Todd and explaining that
the case was never published); see also Wilfred J. Ritz, United States v. Yale Todd (U.S.
1794), 15 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 220, 227-31 (1958) (reprinting all available papers from the
Todd case).
136. BLAINE FREE MOORE, THE SUPREME COURT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 78 (The
Lawbook Exch. 2002) (1913); Ritz, supra note 135, at 227.
137. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
138. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. x1, 1 Stat. 243.
13g. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 5 4, 1 Stat. 243, 244.
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review the decisions of judicial officers."o Four Justices of the Supreme Court
expressed their disapproval of the statute while riding circuit, which they
communicated to Congress.4 ' Two refused to perform their role at all; two of
them acquiesced to carrying out the Act out of feelings of benevolence toward
veterans." They agreed to do so not in their judicial capacity, but as
"commissioners.""' Soon after, Congress revised the pension scheme and
reassigned the circuit judges' duties so as to avoid the constitutional problems.
To address the validity of pension claims decided under the old system,
Congress passed a provision requiring the Secretary of War to "take such
measures as may be necessary" to get the Supreme Court to determine whether
these adjudications by "certain persons styling themselves commissioners"
were valid.'
In United States v. Todd, the Court reached the question that Congress
wanted answered."s Three "commissioners" (including two Justices of the
Court) had in 1792 found Yale Todd of North Haven, Connecticut, eligible for
a pension for injuries suffered during the war.1 6 United States Attorney
General William Bradford brought a suit before the Court seeking the return of
the money that had been awarded to Todd, on the grounds that the
commissioners' adjudication was invalid." The Court agreed with Bradford."4
The Justices did not provide a remedy for the statutory defect (or a reasoned
opinion at all); 4 9 in light of the revised statutory scheme, there was no
practical reason for them to do so.
The history of Hayburn's Case and Todd demonstrates that the judges of the
new federal courts understood limits to exist on their power of judicial review:
severability was the default. The Justices did not put into question the validity
of the rest of the 1792 pension scheme; they only nullified the unconstitutional
eligibility determinations. Like the judges in Rutgers, courts refused to
"execute" an act of the legislature to the extent they thought it was
unconstitutional. Like the judges in Holmes, they engaged in dialogue with
Congress to resolve the statutory defect.
140. Ritz, supra note 135, at 223.
141. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 41o n.*.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, sec. 3, 1 Stat. 324, 325.
145. Ritz, supra note 135, at 227.
146. Id. at 229.
147. Id. at 229-30.
148. Id. at 230.
149. Id.
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The Marshall Court embraced this understanding of severability as the
default remedy for partially unconstitutional statutes, further confirming the
constitutional underpinnings of the severability-default principle. In its first
two decisions declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional, Dred Scott v. Sandford
and Marbury v. Madison, the Court invalidated statutory provisions that it
deemed repugnant to the Constitution, while leaving the rest of the relevant
statutes - the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Missouri Compromise - in force.so
Later decisions continued this trend.15
The Court's severability practice in these cases reflected Chief Justice
Marshall's understanding of the limits of judicial review. In an 1829 case, Bank
of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee,'5 Justice Marshall advanced a conception of
severability that mirrored the state courts' practices in Holmes and Rutgers.
In his opinion for the Court, the Chief Justice instructed an Ohio state court
that, "[i]f any part" of the Ohio occupancy statute at issue in the case "be
unconstitutional, the provisions of that part may be disregarded while full
effect will be given to such as are not repugnant to the constitution of the
United States or of the state."'3 Although the severability of state statutes has,
as a formal matter, become the province of state law rather than Article III,'s4
the dicta in Bank of Hamilton provides a clear window into the method
underlying the Marshall Court's severability practices. The Marshall Court
believed that courts ought to excise unconstitutional provisions from laws
without voiding the laws' constitutional portions.ss
An unbroken line of evidence from the Founding Era thus indicates an
original assumption that judges should retain rather than discard the
constitutional remainders of partially unconstitutional statutes. The
Constitution grants the federal courts the power of judicial review over acts of
Congress. It also requires them to treat the Constitution as a form of higher
law that invalidates those acts - but only so far as they conflict. This
assumption derived from the Founding-Era conception of the Constitution (as
a type of "higher law") and of the Constitution's requirements in the event of
conflict with ordinary law (reconciling its provisions with those of lesser laws).
The severability default arose as a principle of constitutional law; it is a
i5o. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1856); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
151. See, e.g., Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1869); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 603 (1869); Reichart v. Felps, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 16o (1867).
152. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492 (1829).
153. Id. at 526.
154. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) ("Severability is of course a matter of state law.").
155. Walsh, supra note 14, at 757.
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byproduct of the original understanding of the limits on Article III judges'
ability to use the Constitution to invalidate statutes.
The more difficult question is whether the severability-default principle
remains constitutional law. As Section II.C.2 elaborates, changes in the
nineteenth century caused judges to change the way they apply the
severability-default principle. "Refrain[ing] from invalidating more of [a]
statute than is necessary"'" sometimes means declaring a statute inseverable
and striking down the entire thing, including portions that do not directly
conflict with the Constitution.s' Furthermore, as noted at the outset of this
Section, judges and scholars have largely lost sight of the severability-default
principle's constitutional origins.sS Has the principle essentially become a
federal common-law rule, a mere factor to weigh in the severability
determination, or maybe even a tautological formalism, applicable except when
it is not?
The answer appears to be no: the severability default remains an inflexible
constitutional principle. The Justices continue to maintain that they may not
strike down any more of a statute than "necessary" to satisfy their
constitutional role.'59 Although they might sometimes misinterpret "necessary"
and err too much on the side of inseverability, they still recognize the need to
demonstrate why inseverability is a "necessary" remedy, rather than the
default."'o Furthermore, they ground their continued reliance on the principle
in the same constitutional norms that Hamilton used to defend judicial review
in The Federalist Papers. They "try not to nullify more of a legislature's work
than is necessary, for [they] know that '[a] ruling of unconstitutionality
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.""' They
recognize that a judge properly exercising her judicial role must invalidate as
little of a statute as possible. The original understanding of the limits on
judicial review is still at work. There is still an upper bound on how much of a
statute judges can justifiably strike down.
1s6. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468
U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion)).
157. See infra Section II.C.2.
158. See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
159. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2oo6); see, e.g., Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010).
160. But see Campbell, supra note 16 (arguing for a default remedy of inseverability).
161. Id. at 1520 (quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328-30).
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2. The Independent-Remainder Principle: Locating Severability Doctrine in
Article I, Section 7's Definition of Statutory "Law"
This Section traces the origins of the independent-remainder principle of
the Alaska Airlines doctrine: judges must strike down the remaining portions of
partially unconstitutional statutes unless they are "fully operative as a law."
It analyzes the cases in which the Supreme Court developed this principle.
Based on these cases, it argues that the principle is constitutionally required by
the Court's understanding of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution 6 ,: judges
may not constitutionally rewrite federal statutes, even to save them, because
only statutory provisions that go through bicameralism and presentment are
valid law.
First, let us consider an obvious question. If the original understanding of
Article III contemplates that courts will strike down statutes only to the extent
of their unconstitutionality, one might wonder: are the second and third
principles of the Alaska Airlines doctrine unconstitutional? These principles,
after all, direct courts to go beyond the original understanding of severability;
in some cases, courts may strike down a partially unconstitutional law in its
entirety.
The reason for this apparent evolution is that the independent remainder
and hypothetical passage principles of the Alaska Airlines doctrine emerged in
response to changing conditions. The shift in the Court's approach to
severability in the late nineteenth century was a result of its increasing
willingness to exercise its powers of judicial review. 64 The federal courts
invalidated very few federal statutes in their early years. The more a court
strikes down statutes, the more the hard cases of severing unconstitutional
from constitutional provisions will present themselves - in particular, cases
where a statute functions poorly in the absence of its unconstitutional portions.
None of the Founding-Era cases presented such a concern. In Marbury v.
Madison, for example, it was easy for the Court to conclude that the Judiciary
Act of 1789 continued to function as law after excising the invalid mandamus
162. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 1o8 (1976)).
163. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President
of the United States .. .).
164. See, e.g., Note, Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARv. L. REv.
1182, 1183 n.12 (1984) ("Because the concept of severability has no meaning unless a court
can declare a statute unconstitutional, it is not surprising that the possibility of declaring a
law only partially invalid received little attention during the years when the Supreme Court
was consolidating its power of judicial review.").
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jurisdiction provision. 6s Subsequent developments- and in particular,
increasingly complex statutes-have forced the federal courts to clarify when
the remainder of severed statutes can qualify as valid law. When doing so, the
Court did not supersede the original understanding of severability; it simply
addressed novel questions about severability doctrine's metes and bounds that
did not arise in Founding-Era dockets. The federal courts developed the
independent-remainder principle in response to these novel questions.
To figure out whether the second Alaska Airlines principle is
constitutionally required, we must understand how it developed. The phrase
"fully operative as a law" first appeared in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
in 1894. 66 The Court had developed the principle two decades earlier,
however, in a line of cases including United States v. Reese,'6 , Keokuk Northern
Line Packet Co. v. City of Keokuk,'68 and Albany County Supervisors v. Stanley.
In those cases, the Court stated that the remainder of a partially
unconstitutional law must be struck down unless the constitutional provisions
are "severable" from the unconstitutional ones7 -or, in other words, unless
they are "unaffected" by the excision and can "stand alone" as law.'7 '
Although these early cases did not provide much detail about what the
terms "severable" or "fully operative as a law" meant, the Court intended them
165. See Walsh, supra note 14, at 757.
166. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 154 U.S. 362, 395 (1894).
167. 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) ("We are not able to reject a part which is unconstitutional, and
retain the remainder, because it is not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional, if
there be any such, from that which is not.").
168. 95 U.S. 80 (1877).
169. 105 U.S. 305 (1881).
170. Keokuk, 95 U.S. at 89 ("The ordinance of Keokuk has imposed no charge upon these
plaintiffs which it was beyond the power of the city to impose. To the extent to which they
are affected by it there is no valid objection to it. Statutes that are constitutional in part only,
will be upheld so far as they are not in conflict with the Constitution, provided the allowed
and prohibited parts are severable. We think a severance is possible in this case."). In
Keokuk, the Court determined that tonnage fees imposed on vessels docked at a municipal
wharf in Keokuk, Iowa, were constitutional fees for services rather than unconstitutional
restraints on trade. Id. at 87-88. The Court considered near the end of the opinion whether
the state statute that granted Keokuk the authority to impose landing fees had
unconstitutionally given the municipality the power to restrain trade through fees
unconnected to wharfing services. (The Court had previously invalidated such fees in
Cannon v. City of New Orleans, 87 U.S. 577, 581 (1874).) The Court found that it could
"sever[]" the statute's grant of power to impose fees for wharfing services from the power to
impose unconstitutional tonnage fees, and that "[w]hen those provisions are attempted to
be enforced, a different question may be presented." Id. at 88-89. In essence, the Court
saved the constitutionality of the statute by construing its grant of authority narrowly.
171. Stanley, 105 U.S. at 312 (quoting In re Trade-Mark Cases, 1oo U.S. 82, 98 (1879)).
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to indicate that judges may not "give to the words used by Congress a narrower
meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear."1 7  Excision of
unconstitutional statutory provisions or applications in accordance with the
severability-default principle necessarily does violence to a congressionally
enacted text: courts decline to enforce the whole law as written. Unless
Congress included explicit instructions about severability, such as a severability
clause, "nothing in the language of [a] statute" will "authorize" a court's
"distinction" between constitutional and unconstitutional applications or
provisions." A court could, in theory, always rewrite a partially
unconstitutional statute to the point that it becomes constitutional, and never
have to declare a law inseverable."* The independent-remainder principle
stands for the proposition that there are limits on this judicial violence: the
severability-default principle does not license courts to usurp the legislative
role.
Subsequent cases have fleshed out how much judicial rewriting is too
much. In Hill v. Wallace,'7 s the case cited by Alaska Airlines as an example of the
independent-remainder principle at work, the Court invalidated an otherwise
constitutional provision of the Future Trading Act because a different,
unconstitutional provision was so intertwined with it that the constitutional
portion could not fully operate as law without the unconstitutional section.17
Section 4 of the Act placed a tax on futures contracts for grain.'" The tax was
subject to several exceptions, including when the futures contract was made
"through a member of the Board of Trade designated by the Secretary of
Agriculture as a contract market.""8 To receive this designation, the Board of
Trade had to comply with regulations issued by the Secretary."'
The Court applied the independent-remainder p inciple in its holding. The
Court found that Congress exceeded its power under the Taxing Clause in
enacting the tax in section 4-iso As a result, the Court invalidated the
regulations promulgated by the Secretary. The Court found that these
regulations were "so interwoven" with the unconstitutional tax that "they can
172. In re Trade-Mark Cases, loo U.S. at 98.
1n. Stanley, ios U.S. at 313.
174. See, e.g., infra notes 260-262 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell's concerns
about excessive judicial revision in Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979)).
175. 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
176. Id. at 70.
in. Id. at 63.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 63-64.
iso. Id. at 68.
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not be separated."'"' Because of the way the Act was structured, the Secretary's
power to issue regulations would have made no sense in the absence of the
unconstitutional tax provision. To make the Act coherent, the Court would
have had to reinterpret the Act to give the Secretary freestanding authority to
issue regulations governing contract markets. The need for such extensive
judicial revision meant that the regulations were not operative as law on their
own.
The constitutional provisions that undergird the independent-remainder
principle are Article 1118 and Article I, Section 7's definition of statutory
"law."'8 ' Article I, Section 7 lays out the process by which Congress may
pass "bills" and create statutory "law."' Valid federal legislation has to go
through the presentment procedures that the Section outlines: both Houses of
Congress must pass an identical bill that the President must sign.8 s
The Supreme Court's Article I, Section 7 jurisprudence indicates that these
are the only procedures by which statutory law may constitutionally be made.
Notable cases in this line of jurisprudence include INS v. Chadha 86 and Clinton
v. City of New York.'8 7 In both of those cases, the Court conceived of Article I,
Section 7 as a guarantor of the separation of powers.',8 Whether a one-house
resolution originating in Congress, as in Chadha, or a line-item veto by the
President, as in Clinton, legislation that does not pass through bicameralism
and presentment undermines the constitutional balance created by the
Framers.'' A bundle of provisions must go through presentment ogether. If
another branch is responsible for authoring legislation, the legislation is
181. Id. at 7o.
182. U.S. CONsT. art. III, 5 2.
183. Id. art. I, S 7, cl. 2.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
187. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
s88. See id. at 439 ("The procedures governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of
Article I were the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the
Constitution itself."); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946 ("These provisions of [Article I, Section 71
are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers.").
189. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 ("It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in
Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal
Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure."); see also Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-40 (quoting this language from
Chadha in the context of the line-item veto).
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unconstitutional. Clinton shows that this principle applies even when another
branch removes portions of legislation passed by Congress.'
The independent-remainder principle relates directly to Article I, Section 7.
If a law is not workable as a result of partial judicial invalidation - if it makes so
little sense as an independent piece of legislation that no judge can apply it
without rewriting it-then courts should strike it down. Otherwise, by
rewriting the statute to save it, courts would be adding language that did not
go through the Article I, Section 7 presentment procedures.9 '
From its earliest severability cases, the Court's explication of the
independent-remainder principle suggests that it understood the Constitution
to require that principle on presentment grounds. In United States v. Reese, one
of the first cases to apply the "fully operative as a law" concept, the Court
stated that extensive judicial revision of a statute as part of a severability
determination "would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of the government. . . . To limit this statute in the manner now
asked for would be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one. This is no
part of our duty."' 92 The judiciary, reasoned the Reese Court, may not be the
author of legislation. Otherwise, it would be acting as a legislature, in violation
of the constitutional principle that Congress is the sole author of legislation.'93
190. 524 U.S. at 44o ("Our first President understood the text of the Presentment Clause as
requiring that he either 'approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.' What has emerged
in these cases from the President's exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are
truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the
product of the 'finely wrought' procedure that the Framers designed." (footnote omitted)
(quoting 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940))).
191. Of course, the principle also applies to situations where courts do not literally rewrite the
words of a statute but, by altering its scope of application, substantially change its import.
192. 92 U.S. 214, 219-21 (1875).
193. Admittedly, some of this reasoning in Reese might be interpreted to rely on a due-process
rationale rather than on Article I, Section 7. Due process requires courts to strike down
unconstitutionally vague penal statutes because people need notice of the crimes for which
they might be punished. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1999). The
Court's willingness to cite the Reese language in nonpenal contexts, however, indicates that
it understands the "fully operative" principle to have a broader constitutional basis. Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922), and, more recently, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern
New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (20o6), applied this language from Reese to noncriminal
cases. Ayotte, confusingly, cites Reese after reciting the hypothetical-passage principle rather
than the independent-remainder principle (separating it from the former, however, with the
words "[a]ll the while," indicating that Justice O'Connor thought Reese's reasoning
applicable to multiple principles). Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330. Reese, however, makes no mention
of a principle similar to the hypothetical-passage principle-that would have been
anachronistic, since the Supreme Court first applied the hypothetical-passage principle six
years later in Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 8o (188o). See infra Section II.C.3.
1712
125:1672 2o16
HOW TO TRIM A CHRISTMAS TREE
Recent cases have continued to link the independent-remainder principle of
Reese to broader constitutional ideas regarding the separation of powers under
Article I, Section 7. In Ayotte, for example, the Court described the
independent-remainder principle as arising out of courts' "limited . . .
constitutional mandate" that prevents them from engaging in "quintessentially
legislative work" and "invasion of the legislative domain."9 4 It is hard to see
how the Constitution, as the Court has interpreted it, could not require such a
principle. The independent-remainder principle is a direct result of the "finely
wrought and exhaustively considered [presentment] procedure"' that
preserves the balance of powers. It is a constitutional principle.
3. The Hypothetical-Passage Principle: Locating Severability Doctrine in
Prudential Comity Concerns
The same cannot be said for the hypothetical-passage principle of the
Alaska Airlines doctrine. According to that principle, judges must invalidate an
entire statute unless they determine that Congress would have passed the
remainder independently. ,6  That principle was developed in the late
nineteenth century as a consequence of the statutory interpretation
methodology that the Supreme Court favored at the time: purposivism.'97 This
theory presumes that statutes have a single, overriding purpose and that
individual provisions should be interpreted in light of the act's overall
purpose.'8 Unlike the severability default and independent remainder
principles, the hypothetical-passage principle is best understood as federal
common law.
On its surface, the hypothetical-passage principle has some similarities to
the independent-remainder principle: both limit the judiciary's ability to
interfere with the legislature's prerogative to write statutes. But the two
inquiries are distinct. The independent-remainder principle asks whether or
not a partially unconstitutional statute's remainder can stand as a coherent,
independent law without judicial revision. The hypothetical-passage principle,
on the other hand, asks whether the specific Congress that enacted the bill as a
194. 546 U.S. at 329-30.
195. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
196. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987).
197. See infra notes 199-21o and accompanying text.
198. WHiiAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 84-88 (1999) (discussing how Chief Justice Shaw departed from Chief
Justice Marshall's approach to statutory interpretation by looking at legislative intent in
terms of the "whole act" rather than the "literal" meaning).
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whole would have enacted the remainder if it had known of the bill's partial
unconstitutionality. The question is not whether the judiciary would need to
rewrite the statute in order to enforce it, in violation of Article I, Section 7.
Instead, the question is whether courts should defer to Congress by refusing to
apply an otherwise enforceable remainder because Congress would not have
passed the remainder on its own.
The hypothetical-passage principle can be characterized as a creature of
federal common law for two reasons. First, it entered the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence as a common-law principle, drawn from the Court's purposivist
understanding of statutory interpretation. Second, according to the Court's
Article I, Section 7 jurisprudence, the hypothetical-passage principle is not
constitutionally required, and therefore it cannot be a direct interpretation of
the Constitution.
There is clear evidence that the hypothetical-passage principle is a
common-law rule: it was borrowed from a Massachusetts judicial decision, and
it was based on prudential statutory interpretation concerns rather than on
constitutional commands or principles.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pioneered an alternative to
the Marshall Court's approach to severability'99 in the 1854 case Warren v. City
of Charlestown.2oo The case concerned a law enacted to merge the cities of
Boston and Charlestown. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute failed to
provide adequate political representation to the residents of Charlestown."
Deviating from its past practice of invalidating only unconstitutional portions
of statutes," the court held: "When the parts of a statute are so mutually
connected and dependent, . . . as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the
legislature would not pass the residue independently," all of the parts are void
if any one of these dependent parts is found unconstitutional."
The Warren rule was a principle of statutory interpretation. Chief Justice
Shaw, the author of Warren, was one of the great theorists and proponents of
purposivism -the doctrine that courts should interpret statutes in light of the
legislature's purpose in enacting them.
199. Stern, supra note 12, at 79-80.
2oo. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 99-oo (1854).
201. Id. at 92-93.
202. See, e.g., Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (i Gray) 1, 1 (1854) ("Where part only of a statute is
repugnant to the constitution, that part only will be adjudged void.").
203. Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 99.
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The Warren test is based on this theory of interpretation. The test applies
where the legislature "intended [the parts of a statute to work] as a whole"2o 4 -
in other words, where purposivism is the appropriate interpretive
methodology. Later in the opinion, Chief Justice Shaw explained: "[I]f this act
be unconstitutional at all it is not in any separate and independent enactments,
but in the entire scope and purpose of the act."2 os On the other hand, "if the
main objects and purposes of the act are constitutional, they may be carried
into effect, although there may be isolated clauses, or separate or independent
enactments" that are unconstitutional. In other words, Chief Justice Shaw
was concerned with the constitutionality of the act's "entire scope and
purpose." If the act's entire purpose was unconstitutional, then courts could
not give effect to any of the act's provisions. In light of the act's null and void
purpose, courts must interpret the act's provisions to be null and void as well,
even if they are fully operative as a law, because individual provisions must be
interpreted in light of the whole act's purpose. The Warren principle, then, was
originally conceived as an application of statutory interpretation methodology.
Warren was a very influential decision, and a number of other state courts
adopted its approach in the decades after it was decided.' 7 In the 188o case
Allen v. Louisiana,208 the Supreme Court introduced the severability principle of
Warren into its jurisprudence. The Court cited the Warren test verbatim.209
The fact that the hypothetical-passage principle came into the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence via the Massachusetts court does not necessarily mean it
is common law. The Supreme Court could conceivably borrow from a state
court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution as persuasive authority. But
the Warren rule was not drawn from the federal Constitution. The Court
adopted the Warren principle during the period where it was embracing
purposivism, the era of Holy Trinity Church v. United States.21o It is reasonable
to suppose that the Court understood the principle as a common-law import
related to the proper method of interpreting statutes - a principle not drawn
from or required by any jurisdiction's constitution. It did not presume that the
principle was mandated by the Federal Constitution.
204. Id. at 84.
205. Id. at 99-oo.
206. Id. at 97.
207. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Mills, 19 Cal. 513, 523 (1861); State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290, 299
(1856); Slauson v. City of Racine, 13 Wis. 398, 404 (i861).
208. 103 U.S. So (188o).
209. Id. at 83-84.
210. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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There is another argument that the hypothetical-passage principle is not
constitutional law: the Court's jurisprudence indicates that the principle
cannot be constitutionally required. If we wanted to locate a constitutional
basis for the hypothetical-passage principle, we might look again to Article I,
Section 7. Statutory law must go through the presentment procedures to be
valid." Arguably, if a court determines that Congress would not have enacted
the remainder of a partially unconstitutional bill on its own, the remainder
would violate the presentment requirement-it could not hypothetically have
passed through the Article I, Section 7 procedures."
But the same Article I, Section 7 jurisprudence that justifies the
independent-remainder principle dictates that the hypothetical-passage
principle cannot be constitutionally mandated. Congress has the power to
present complete bills to the President, subject to an up-or-down veto.
Chadha, Clinton, and other cases confirm the importance of this requirement.14
It is in the very nature of Congress's power that it may include provisions in
bills that would not pass through the presentment procedures on their own."s
If we impose a requirement on Congress that all hypothetical permutations of a
bill have sufficient support to pass on their own, we profoundly limit
Congress's lawmaking power and disturb the balance of powers."' The
hypothetical-passage test is not contrary to the Constitution; courts might
justifiably decline to enforce a statutory remainder with weak hypothetical
congressional support. But the Constitution does not require such a result.
Furthermore, trying to tie the hypothetical-passage principle to the
Constitution ignores the role of the President in the presentment process.
Requiring a showing that a majority of Congress would have enacted the
remainder of a partially unconstitutional statute forgets that presidential assent
is needed before a bill becomes law." The hypothetical-passage principle's
failure to take account of the President's role in enacting statutes is further
evidence that the Warren principle does not sound in Article I, Section 7. When
211. See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
212. See Campbell, supra note 16, at 1498-99; see also Fish, supra note 14, at 1316.
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
214. See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
216. When the other branches place constraints on Congress's lawmaking powers, they disturb
the balance of powers. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 440-41 (1998) ("What
has emerged in these cases from the President's exercise of his statutory cancellation powers,
however, are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are
not the product of the 'finely wrought' procedure that the Framers designed.").
217. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 7, cl. 2.
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applying the principle, courts examine the will of Congress."' They do not care
about the bill's hypothetical ability to fulfill all of the presentment
requirements. There is another setting in which courts conspicuously tend to
care about only Congress's (and not the President's) role in enacting
legislation: statutory interpretation."' The hypothetical-passage principle's
solicitude for Congress's intent is a means of deferring to the branch that
writes statutes when figuring out how to give them force -just as in statutory
interpretation.22 It is not a means of enforcing the presentment requirement.
Put another way, the Constitution did not enact Chief Justice Shaw's
purposivism." Reasonable jurists disagree about which principles of statutory
interpretation are valid. That is one reason why Abbe Gluck considers them
federal common law': they are applied too inconsistently and haphazardly to
be constitutional. There is no consensus that the Constitution requires the
purposivism underlying Warren. Textualists, for example, argue that a
statutory text encodes legislative bargains that judges should neither inquire
into nor disturb." A corollary is that statutory provisions do not have to relate
to a statute's overriding purpose - or even to have garnered hypothetical
majority support-for courts to enforce them.2' So long as a statutory
provision went through the presentment procedures, textualists ought to agree,
courts may constitutionally give it effect.
None of this is to say that the Warren principle does not make prudential
sense. It accords with courts' general desire to serve the intent of Congress
when applying statutory law.22 If a court finds clear evidence that Congress
would not have wanted the remainder enforced, it may be a wise exercise of the
218. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) ("The final test . .. is the traditional
one: the unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute created in its absence
is legislation that Congress would not have enacted." (emphasis added)).
219. Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First Word: The President's Place in "Legislative History,"
89 MICH. L. REV. 399, 402 (1990) (describing the "near-exclusive focus on congressional
materials" in statutory interpretation).
220. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 30, § 45:5.
221. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
222. See Gluck, supra note 79, at 778-79.
223. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 431 (2005); see also
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 16-23
(1997) (critiquing the idea of legislative intent).
224. Manning, supra note 223, at 431 ("Legislative outcomes necessarily hinge on arbitrary (or at
least nonsubstantive) factors such as the sequence in which alternatives are presented."
(quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, i HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 64 (1988))).
225. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 30, § 45:5.
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judicial role not to enforce it. But the Constitution does not require this result.
When courts strike down statutes based on the hypothetical-passage principle,
they are operating in the realm of common law.
4. Distinguishing the Independent-Remainder Principle from the
Hypothetical-Passage Principle
Judges and scholars often conflate the independent remainder and
hypothetical passage principles. The Alaska Airlines opinion is confusingly
written and makes the mistake easy. As noted in Section I.A, Alaska Airlines
describes the independent-remainder principle in terms of congressional
intent: "Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed provision
to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the legislation
is incapable of functioning independently.",6 To be clear, this characterization
of the principle does not require courts to inquire into legislative intent in every
case. Instead, it establishes an intent-based rationale for the independent-
remainder principle, based on a presumption about Congress's collective
mind." The Alaska Airlines Court had no need to include this language, but it
did-and that has led to confusion. '
226. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
227. The Alaska Airlines opinion makes this evident when it goes on to describe an additional
inquiry into "whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of
Congress." Id. at 685.
228. The NFIB dissenters succumbed to this confusion. They ignored the severability default and
independent remainder principles when describing the test for severability. Instead, they
characterized the entire severability inquiry in terms of legislative intent, dividing it into two
parts:
First, if the Court holds a statutory provision unconstitutional, it then determines
whether the now truncated statute will operate in the manner Congress
intended . . . . Second, even if the remaining provisions can operate as Congress
designed them to operate, the Court must determine if Congress would have
enacted them standing alone and without the unconstitutional portion.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2668-69 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). Confusingly, however, the dissenters equated
the first part of this inquiry with Free Enterprise Fund's recitation of the requirement that a
statute's remainder be "fully operative as a law," id. at 2669 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010)), a text-based test that
requires no inquiry into congressional intent. Indeed, Free Enterprise Fund explicitly
distinguishes the independent-remainder test from the Warren hypothetical-passage test,
which it cites separately. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509. Similarly, the NFIB dissenters
equated their test with the Trade-Mark Cases' admonishment that courts refrain from
"mak[ing] a new law" rather than "enforc[ing] an old one." NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2676 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting In re Trade-Mark Cases, ioo U.S. 82,
1718
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It is important, however, to preserve the independent-remainder principle
as distinct from the hypothetical-passage principle. It is true, in a strict sense,
that the independent-remainder p inciple is related to respect for congressional
intent. In the severability context, separation of powers is ultimately about
respect for Congress's lawmaking powers. But, as noted in Section II.C.2, the
independent-remainder principle's enforcement of the separation of powers is
rooted in the presentment requirement of Article I, Section 7. The
hypothetical-passage principle, on the other hand, enforces the separation of
powers for prudential reasons. That can make a jurisprudential difference that
one neglects if one assimilates the former principle into the latter.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: a statute requires "all
American citizens" to pay a "Special Supplemental Tax" to the Federal
Treasury. The Court finds the statute unconstitutional (on some sort of
federalism or capitation tax" grounds) as applied to citizens of the states but
not to those in the District of Columbia. Suppose, however, that congressional
drafters have included a super-strong severability clause in the statute, which
states: "It is the intent of Congress that the courts shall enforce this law's
provisions, even after a ruling of partial unconstitutionality, to the greatest
extent possible. Congress would have passed this law no matter what
severability determination the Court might make." The Court now has to
decide on severability. What should it do?
If we follow a legislative-intent-only approach, it seems clear that the Court
would have to sever the unconstitutional portions of the statute and enforce the
supplemental tax only as applied to citizens in the District of Columbia.
Congress made a clear textual declaration recognizing that the Court might
sever the law and stating that it wanted the Court to do so. Perhaps the
legislative history also indicated that Congress wanted at least some people to
pay the revenue-raising tax, and that it would throw equity to the wind. Such a
determination, however, would be constitutionally problematic. True, the
statute's severability clause ties Congress to the mast of whatever severability
determination courts reach. But courts, by severing the statute in the manner
suggested, would be radically revising the statutory scheme. It would be
changing "all American citizens" to "American citizens living in the District of
Columbia." As in United States v. Reese, the law's application to citizens in the
District of Columbia, while perfectly constitutional, is too "intertwined"230
99 (1879)). These statements suggest that the dissenters are subsuming the textualist
independent remainder principle into the intent-based hypothetical passage principle.
229. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.").
230. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
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with its application to citizens of the states to justify severing one from the
other.3 ' It is for Congress, not the Court, to rewrite the law in this manner.
This is a situation in which the independent-remainder principle makes a
jurisprudential contribution. The hypothetical-passage principle, on its own,
leads to a constitutionally problematic result.
An analogous situation is not inconceivable. Congress frequently includes
severability clauses in statutes, albeit with less insistent language. There are
situations in which a severed statute may function as Congress intended-
because Congress included a severability clause and would prefer limited or
piecemeal application of a statute to none-but in which the function of the
remaining statute is impermissibly altered. 2  Hence the continued need to
leave room for both analyses in the doctrine and to avoid conflating statutory
interdependence with legislative intent.
There is another reason to keep the two principles analytically distinct. As
discussed in Section II.C.3, the hypothetical-passage principle is not
constitutionally mandated; it is a prudential doctrine derived from the
purposivist approach to statutory interpretation. Conflating this with the
independent-remainder principle causes the judge to lose sight of the
prudential nature of the hypothetical-passage principle. For example, one
version of this conflation is that any alteration to a law that causes it to no
longer "operate in the manner Congress intended" amounts to judicial
rewriting and necessitates a finding of inseverability.3 Adopting this version
of the test would require courts to strike down entire statutes superfluously. If
I tell a colleague, "Go to the butcher's and fetch me a leg of lamb, and then go
to the fishmonger's and fetch me a salmon filet," and then a judge rules that
the transportation of fish by those other than its end consumers is
unconstitutional, the severed instructions would "operate in a manner"
different from what I intended: I would only get a delivery of lamb and not
fish. But the judge would not be rewriting the lamb instruction when severing
231. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1875).
232. But see Fish, supra note 14, at 1305. Indeed, Fish seems to admit as much later in the same
article. See id. at 1342-43 ("Severability clauses are generally not applied to specific statutory
text, but communicate a general legislative intention that pieces of the statute be treated as
severable. That intention could be defeated in any particular case if severance would leave
the remaining language incoherent or unenforceable.").
233. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); see also id. at
2674 ("Congress designed the exchanges so the shopper can compare benefits and prices.
But the comparison cannot be made in the way Congress designed if the prices depend on
the shopper's pre-existing health conditions. The prices would vary from person to person.
So without community rating -which prohibits insurers from basing the price of insurance
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the fish instruction. That instruction would remain the same. The excision
would pose no Article I, Section 7 problem.
The independent-remainder principle is concerned with judicial revisions
that make the law actually operate in a diferent way: those that make the words
mean something different, or mean nothing at all, or apply to different people
or circumstances than they would without the excision. The hypothetical-
passage principle, on the other hand, is concerned with whether a perfectly
constitutional excision leads to a legislative scheme that Congress would not
have enacted, and whether courts should, out of respect for Congress's
legislative prerogative, invalidate the scheme entirely. When they rely on the
hypothetical-passage principle, courts take the extraordinary step of refraining
from enforcing duly enacted law. To justify this, the principle must represent a
higher bar to invalidation than the nebulous standard of "operating in a
different manner from what Congress intended." Hence the Warren principle's
focus on a specific type of legislative intent: whether Congress would have
wanted the unconstitutional provision separated, or, alternatively, whether
Congress would have passed the remainder on its own. The independent
remainder and hypothetical passage principles are distinct, and separately
sourced: the former is a constitutional command, and the latter is federal
common law.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL INCOMPATIBILITY OPTION
Part II showed that the Alaska Airlines doctrine is a mixture of federal
common law and constitutional law. In particular, the first two principles of
the doctrine - the presumption of severability and the requirement that a
partially unconstitutional statute's remainder be "fully operative as a law" - are
constitutionally required. The third principle-the inquiry into whether
Congress would have enacted the statute's remainder independently- is a
prudential, common-law principle.
This Part explores how judges can use these doctrinal foundations to form
a severability doctrine tailored to omnibus statutes. Building on the discussion
of omnibus lawmaking in Section I.B, it first examines the difficulties that
courts may face when applying the three principles of the Alaska Airlines
doctrine to omnibus statutes. It then introduces a partial remedy to these
problems: the German Constitutional Court's incompatibility option. It argues
that the incompatibility option better serves the constitutional and prudential
concerns underlying severability doctrine than does the wholesale invalidation
of partially unconstitutional statutes. Finally, it makes a positive case for what
an American incompatibility option would look like and under what conditions
judges should use it.
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A. The Need for an Alternative Approach to Severability for Omnibus Statutes
Applying severability doctrine to omnibus statutes presents problems that
do not arise when severability doctrine is applied to ordinary legislation.
Section I.B identified three characteristics that distinguish omnibus lawmaking
from conventional legislative practices. We can now pinpoint what difficulties
these distinctions pose for the application of the Alaska Airlines doctrine.
First, the uncertain interdependence of an omnibus bill's provisions
presents problems when applying the independent-remainder principle. For
instance, in a strict sense, the ACA would function as law in the absence of the
individual mandate. Uninsured individuals would no longer have an obligation
to pay a penalty. The Act's other reforms are intelligible and implementable
without this obligation. But, as the NFIB dissenters pointed out, the law would
not function in the same way without the individual mandate. Most obviously,
the missing tax increases would no longer fund the Medicaid expansion and
federal subsidies that are crucial to the law's ability to reduce the uninsured
population." The NFIB dissenters- quoting the Trade-Mark Cases'
enumeration of the independent-remainder principle -claimed that severance
of the individual mandate would amount to "mak[ing] a new law, not ...
enforc[ing] an old one.""s The NFIB dissenters overstated their case.
Disrupting Congress's budgetary project cannot be what we mean by "writing
new law"; otherwise any statutory addition or subtraction with budgetary
implications would be judicial revision, and no laws would survive the
independent-remainder principle." Even so, we can undoubtedly imagine
situations where excising a central provision of a complex, single-subject
omnibus bill like the ACA would cause problems for judges when applying the
independent-remainder principle.
Second, the murky procedures of omnibus lawmaking spell trouble for the
hypothetical-passage principle. As discussed in Section II.C.3, the main
prudential underpinning of this principle is the idea - familiar from the field of
statutory interpretation -that courts should respect the intent of Congress
when giving effect to legislation. The messiness and complexity of omnibus
lawmaking mean that the presumptions undergirding the Warren principle -
that acts have a single purpose, and that courts should refrain from
undermining that purpose - do not apply. In omnibus statutes, the legal fiction
234. Id. at 2675.
235. Id. at 2676 (quoting In re Trade-Mark Cases, ioo U.S. 82, 99 (1879)).
236. The dissenters appear to conflate the second and third Alaska Airlines principles; for
instance, they describe the budgetary implications as causing the law not to "operate in the
manner Congress intended." Id. at 2675; see supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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of legislative intent37 fractures to the point of incoherence. On what, therefore,
should judges base their hypothetical passage principle analysis?
Adding further complication is the prevalence of procedural - as opposed to
substantive -bargaining, especially for multisubject omnibus bills. As
previously discussed, another way to apply the hypothetical-passage principle
is to determine whether Congress would have passed the bill had Congress
known that a provision was unconstitutional. It is plausible for judges to
analyze substantive bargaining-when lawmakers compromise or logroll to
reach consensus policy positions -because most policies in a bill founded on
substantive bargaining have hypothetical majority support. Individually, the
bill's provisions might not have mirrored the policy preferences of any given
member, but every member that voted for the bill preferred that the
compromise mix of provisions become law. If the loss of one part of the bill
through a finding of unconstitutionality would have made the remainder of the
compromise unappealing, the judge should strike down the entire law. That is
an undoubtedly complicated, but theoretically achievable, task.
Procedural bargaining complicates the analysis. As the NFIB dissenters
noted, the ACA included many provisions that only one or two members
would support, like a provision increasing Medicaid payments solely in
Louisiana.28 The NFIB dissenters thought that the presence of "ornaments"
like these meant the entire ACA should be struck down because these
legislative baubles would not have passed into law on their own. But the
analysis is not that simple. As noted in Section I.B, omnibus measures founded
on procedural compromise routinely attract outsized bipartisan support.
Lawmakers vote for bills containing provisions that they would not have
supported as stand-alone bills. They do so because they come to see the
omnibus bill as "must-pass" legislation, which they will support even if they
disagree with much of its substance. "Must-pass" status can be achieved in two
ways. First, the bill might contain provisions that a congressional majority
considers crucial to enact into law - for example, an appropriations bill funding
a branch of government."9 Second, a sufficient number of legislators might
want to enact particular provisions strongly enough that they will tolerate
237. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 881 (1930) ("The 'intent of the
legislature' is a futile bit of fiction.").
238. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2675 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
239. See, e.g., Maggie Severns, Boehner's Last Fight with Obama, POLTIco (Oct. 21,
2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2ol5/io/john-boehner-vouchers-education
-schools-republicans-214984 [http://perma.cc/HXM8-HNXD] ("After the House passes its
measure, voucher proponents' best bet is to tuck the program into a larger, must-pass law -
and there are plenty of those in the congressional pipeline, including bills to increase the
debt limit and keep the government funded past Dec. ii.").
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other legislators' favored provisions in the same omnibus vehicle."o Grab-bag
provisions - ornaments without a Christmas-tree trunk supporting them -
surely exist.' To apply the Warren test faithfully, one must recognize this
reality.
For judges to apply the hypothetical-passage principle to these laws, they
would have to figure out on what basis a sufficient majority of lawmakers
supported the law. Did a lawmaker consider the presence of the
unconstitutional provisions necessary for her support? If so, the analysis is
easy. If not, it gets murkier. In the absence of the severed provisions, would she
have voted for an omnibus vehicle containing the remaining provisions? That
would depend on whether she approved of the remaining policies, or,
alternatively, whether she considered the vehicle to be a must-pass bill for one
reason or another. Judges would have to delve deeply into the minds of
individual members, only to arrive at a precarious and dubious legal fiction.
Finally, omnibus legislation presents logistical difficulties for courts
applying the three Alaska Airlines principles. The length and intricacy of
statutes have grown since the Marshall Court era. As far back as Holmes v.
Walton,'42 courts and legislatures have recognized that an effective doctrine of
severability requires the judiciary to set clear guidelines about which parts of a
partially unconstitutional statute should remain good law.'4' If a court fails to
do so, the public will face uncertainty about which parts remain in force.'
Courts are ill-equipped, as Justice Scalia pointed out during the NFIB oral
argument, to provide clear guidance on which of the thousands of provisions in
240. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note io, at 27 ("The reality of the passage -I
mean, this was a piece of legislation which, there was - had to be a concerted effort to gather
enough votes so that it could be passed. And I suspect with a lot of these miscellaneous
provisions that Justice Breyer was talking about, that was the price of a vote: Put in the
Indian health care provision and I will vote for the other 2700 pages. Put in the black lung
provision, and I'll go along with it. That's why all -many of these provisions, I think, were
put in, not because they were unobjectionable.").
241. Of course, perceiving a bill as a grab bag of goodies will often depend on one's voting stance
on the bill; it is unlikely that a supporter would ever admit that a bill is such a hodgepodge.
See, e.g., KRuTz, supra note 42, at 2 (quoting Senator Robert Byrd's remark about the 1998
omnibus funds bill: "Do I know what's in this bill? Are you kidding? No. Only God knows
what's in this monstrosity."); Stimulus Package Earmarks Billionsfor Florida, WOKV (Jan. 29,
2oo9, 6:22 AM), http://www.wokv.com/news/news/stimulus-package armarks bilVnpfk
[http://perma.cc/QPY2-TN5W] (quoting Republican Representative Ander Crenshaw as
saying that the 2009 stimulus package "really is just a grab bag of spending programs" and
that "[ilt's almost like everything you ever wanted to spend money on but were too afraid to
ask").
242. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
243. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2668-69.
244. See Gans, supra note 107, at 687.
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a complex statute would remain in force after the statute's partial invalidation."s
Judicial opinions are relatively short, and judges generally do not have the
expertise, time, or resources to review each provision in a complicated statute
for constitutionality. There is some logic to scrapping such laws in toto and
giving the legislature a chance to start anew. Using the hypothetical-passage
principle, in other words, is attractive where a nontrivial portion of an omnibus
statute is found unconstitutional.
American courts face a difficult choice when determining the remedy for
a partially unconstitutional piece of omnibus legislation. 6 The Alaska Airlines
principles produce indeterminate or prudentially unsatisfactory results when
applied to omnibus statutes. Judges must apply the test, however: the
severability default and independent remainder principles are constitutionally
required, and the hypothetical-passage principle is conventionally employed.
So, based on this test, they must decide on an ill-fitting remedy: try to sever
the unconstitutional provisions, or strike down the full statute.
But there is a way out of the quandary. Courts have a superior alternative to
the two options above: the remedy of constitutional incompatibility. The
incompatibility option, as this Note calls it, gives judges a powerful tool to
address the unique challenges of severing omnibus statutes. Section III.B
describes the incompatibility option and the role that it plays in German
constitutional jurisprudence.
B. The German Incompatibility Option
The German Constitutional Court possesses the power to declare
unconstitutional statutes null and void- "nichtig" -in whole or in part." In
addition, the German Constitutional Court can declare an unconstitutional
statute incompatible - "unvereinbar" -with the German Constitution (the Basic
Law). When the court employs the incompatibility option, a law does not
immediately become void. Rather, the court will suspend any voidance of the
law for a defined period of time, giving the relevant legislature the opportunity
to amend the law to make it constitutional.'8 Sometimes, the court will go so
245. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note lo, at 38 ("Mr. Kneedler, what happened to the
Eighth Amendment? You really want us to go through these 2,700 pages?").
246. See Gans, supra note 107, at 665-66 ("[T]he Court is thrust into the job of rewriting the
[partially unconstitutional] statute from aposition of severe constraint.").
247. DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 35-37 (3d ed. 2012).
248. Id.
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far as to set out specific changes that the legislature must make in order for the
statute to achieve constitutionality."
The German Constitutional Court has used declarations of
incompatibility to remedy many cases that fall in the grey zone between
unconstitutional provisions that are clearly severable from their parent laws
and unconstitutional provisions that render the entire law invalid. The first
incompatibility judgment came in 1958,2so in what is known in English as the
Nudist Colony Case.2s' The case involved the conviction of a couple for violating
an antipornography statute by exposing their neighbors' daughter to
magazines that advertised the nudist lifestyle. The court that convicted the
couple ruled that it was no defense that the daughter's parents had given
permission for her to view the nudist magazines, because under the law parents
did not have the right to expose their children to pornographic images." The
constitutional court held that the law was incompatible with the Basic Law
insofar as it interfered with parents' right to oversee their children's
upbringing."'
The court's remedy did not void the law outright or limit its applicability.
Instead, it set out the constitutional norms that the legislature had to follow to
bring the law into compliance with the Basic Law. It held that the law would
need to make available a defense that a child's guardian had authorized
exposure to morally corrupt materials."
The invention of the incompatibility remedy likely made little practical
difference to the court's disposition of the case. It is very likely that, if the court
had struck down the statute in its entirety, the legislature would have quickly
passed a new version of the law that included a parental-consent exception.
Severability was easy to decide in the Nudist Colony Case because it involved
conduct that the legislature clearly intended to penalize up to the constitutional
limit.
The divergence between American and German severability doctrine is
sharper in cases involving issues of legislative bargaining. One of the most
249. Id. at 35-36.
25o. See PETER E. HEIN, DIE UNVEREINBARERKIARUNG VERFASSUNGSWIDRIGER GESETZE DURCH
DAs BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 11 11.3 (1988) (listing cases where the German
Constitutional Court has used the incompatibility remedy).
251. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 1o, 1958, 7
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 32o. The English name is
taken from KOMMERs & MILER, supra note 247, at 840.
252. 7 BVERFGE 320 (' 8).
253. Id. 55 19-20.
254. Id. 5 19.
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notable recent examples of the German Constitutional Court's incompatibility
approach came in the Asylum Seekers' Case, when the court declared Germany's
Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act unconstitutional.ss As the court recognized in its
judgment, the law resulted from a compromise between, on the one hand,
Social Democrats in the Bundestag who wanted to provide welfare benefits to
asylum seekers living in the country and, on the other, conservatives who
feared that the benefits might make Germany a magnet for refugees. The Act
set benefits for asylum seekers far below those provided to unemployed
German citizens, and disallowed them from holding jobs. *
Over time, inflation eroded the value of the benefits and, in the meantime,
the European Union's coordinated asylum regime reduced the number of
refugees arriving in Germany. Additionally, in 2010, the German
Constitutional Court announced that all German residents had a fundamental
constitutional right to "a subsistence minimum that is in line with human
dignity.""
The German Constitutional Court based its judgment in the Asylum
Seekers' Case not only on the right to a subsistence minimum but also on Article
3, the Basic Law's version of the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that
the legislature had provided no legitimate reason why asylum seekers received
significantly lower benefits than German citizens. For its remedy, the court
used the incompatibility approach. It announced that the Bundestag had to
revise the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act to meet constitutional requirements as
soon as possible.""
This case is more difficult to analogize to American severability doctrine
because the U.S. Supreme Court has not interpreted the U.S. Constitution to
provide analogous positive welfare rights.2 s" As a result, Congress would not
face an affirmative burden to provide asylum seekers with benefits. To focus
only on the equal protection aspect of the case, however, if an American court
25S. BVerfG, July 18, 2012, 1 BvL o/1o, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de
/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2o12/07/S20120718l1bvlooioloen.html [http://perma.cc
/ 5NP7-9ZTR].
256. Id. 15 2-45, 97.
257. BVerfG, Feb. 9, 2010, 1 BvL 1/09, I 1, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de
/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/201o/o2/1s2o100209_1bvlooologen.html [http://perma
.cc/59QU-7HVD].
258. See BVerfG, July 18, 2012, 1 BvL o/1o, ¶¶ 99-lo9. The court applied a harsher remedy than
normal in this case (providing retroactive higher benefits to asylum seekers) because it
found that the legislature had deliberately ignored the effect of the court's 2010 holding on
the right to a minimum existence in failing to revise the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act. Id.
259. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 484-87 (1970).
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deployed the hypothetical-passage principle, it would have to invalidate the
country's entire welfare regime for the unemployed. The benefits for asylum
seekers were set deliberately low as part of a political bargain. If the legislature
knew ex ante that it would have to provide asylum seekers with roughly the
same level of benefits as German citizens (or else come up with a
constitutionally acceptable reason for not doing so), this knowledge would
potentially have altered the political calculus underlying the benefit levels
authorized for both asylum seekers and citizens. The remedy of automatically
setting asylum seekers' benefits at the same level as citizens' would disregard
clear legislative intent. The only justifiable remedy would be for the court to
void the benefits for both citizens and asylum seekers and expect the legislature
to start again from scratch.
Relevant differences between German and American substantive law and
judicial review aside, this example is more than hypothetical in American law.
In the 1979 case Califano v. Westcott,o the Court confronted a statute that
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of gender by withholding welfare
benefits from unemployed mothers while extending them to unemployed
fathers. The Justices agreed on the merits but disagreed on the remedy. Justice
Powell, in dissent, wrote that the Court could not simply extend benefits to
mothers under the statute:
We cannot assume that Congress in 1968 would have approved this
extension if it had known that ultimately payments would be made
whenever either parent became unemployed. Nor can we assume that
Congress now would adopt such a system in light of the Court's ruling
that § 407 is invalid. 61
After arguing in favor of nullifying the statute in toto, Justice Powell suggested
that Congress could eventually use retroactive payments to make up for the
resulting gaps.6 '
This was, mutatis mutandis, the remedy that the dissent favored in NFB.13
Because taking out the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion would
disrupt Congress's ex ante bargaining, the Court could not allow the
260. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
261. Id. at 95-96 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
262. Id. at 96.
263. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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bargained-for statutory "ornaments" to survive.64 So the whole law had to
go. z65
C. An American Incompatibility Option
Suppose instead that the Supreme Court had declared the individual
mandate and Medicaid expansion unconstitutional, but had implemented a
German-style incompatibility remedy. The Court could have delayed the
ACA's implementation for a reasonable period of time, 66 holding instead that
all of the Act's provisions that were clearly severable from the individual
mandate and Medicaid expansion would automatically go into effect if the
legislature did not act.
Under this approach, the Court could have combined the constitutional
baseline of invalidating a law only to the extent of its unconstitutionality with
an opportunity for the legislature itself to make the political judgments
necessary to fix the law. Congress, in turn, would have been able to revise the
law without having to worry about the fate of clearly constitutional and
severable provisions of the Act. And if a majority of Congress were to find the
law entirely unsuitable absent the individual mandate and Medicaid
expansion-which the dissent thought it would-it would also have had the
option of repealing the law entirely. By engaging in interbranch dialogue, the
courts and Congress would together come to a solution better than any
available under current severability doctrine."
This Section proposes an American incompatibility option in greater detail
and identifies the situations in which the incompatibility option would
outperform current severability doctrine. First, it argues that the
incompatibility option would better address the unique severability problems
that omnibus statutes present. It then demonstrates that the incompatibility
option would accord well with the constitutional and common law principles
of the Court's severability doctrine. Finally, it provides a brief summary of the
considerations that should lead a judge to choose the incompatibility option.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. This would not have been hard to do, given that many of the Act's provisions were not
scheduled to go into effect until 2014, two years after the decision. See Key Features of the
Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.hhs
.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/key-features-of-aca-by-year/index.html [http://perma.cc
/B5V8-9KN7).
267. Cf Gans, supra note 107, at 663-64 (discussing the benefits of interbranch dialogue).
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i. How the Incompatibility Option Would Address the Unique
Characteristics of Omnibus Statutes
The incompatibility option would often be a superior remedy to a
declaration of severability or inseverability when deciding the severability of
omnibus statutes. As discussed in Section I.B and Section III.A, several
characteristics of omnibus statutes make it difficult to decide their severability:
the burden of figuring out the interdependence of their provisions, the lack of
unified legislative intent, the importance of procedural bargaining, and the
logistical burden of parsing massive and complex laws.
The incompatibility option would better address the challenges that
omnibus statutes pose for the application of the hypothetical-passage principle:
spotty evidence of legislative intent and unconventional bargaining practices.
The option would obviate the need for the judge to inquire into Congress's
hypothetical intent based on a nonexistent legislative record or procedural
practices on which the judge is not an expert. Instead, the judge would place
the determination into Congress's hands: Congress could choose to let the
remainder of the law stand or to revise the legislation. The incompatibility
option would banish the specter of a judge throwing up her hands at the
severability enterprise and letting a massive law fall on account of a minor
constitutional issue. Instead, Congress and the judge would decide severability
jointly.
Admittedly, the process would have its own drawbacks. The Congress that
would pass a revised statute might not be the same Congress that passed the
original. Cases can take years to wind their way through the courts and
congressional turnover can occur quickly. Even so, a changed Congress would
still be better situated to make the severability determination than a judge.
Overlapping membership, institutional memory, a better understanding of
congressional practices and expectations, combined with the reality that
members would have to live with the consequences of their severability
maneuvers,268 all make Congress the superior actor to decide severability.
Furthermore, the default would be to save the remainder of the statute in the
absence of congressional action. Suppose that the party that was in the
majority when the law was first passed found itself in a weaker position by the
time a court made an incompatibility determination. That party would have
the opportunity to block a revised law that it thought inferior to the severed
version of the original.
268. In other words, if one party irresponsibly dismantles the other party's law when it is in the
majority, it will have to pay the price for retaliatory behavior when it again finds itself in the
minority. Judges do not face such pressures.
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Moreover, the incompatibility option would not fully address the logistical
difficulties of parsing omnibus statutes or of determining how a statute's
provisions interrelate. A judge exercising the incompatibility option would still
employ the severability default and independent remainder principles of the
Alaska Airlines doctrine. The Constitution requires it. There is no way to
alleviate the logistical burden of making these determinations.
Nonetheless, the incompatibility option offers room for creative judicial
practice. The temporary injunction would give judges additional time to
accommodate the length and complexity of omnibus statutes. The judge's
initial order containing the fallback option could set out, in broad yet
suggestive strokes, which types of provisions would be unconstitutional and,
consequently, which other provisions would not be fully operative as law.
During the injunction period, the judge could put additional effort into sifting
through the legislation or delegate the task to a special master. The final order
lifting the injunction could then express the judge's conclusive determination
of severability in sufficient detail to guide judges, legislators, and the public.
2. How the Incompatibility Option Would Harmonize with Current
Severability Doctrine
The incompatibility option would constitute a new remedy, not a new
doctrine. It would avoid the harsh consequences that can arise when applying
the hypothetical-passage principle, not provide a new test for severability. The
incompatibility option would furnish judges with an alternative means to give
effect to prudential principles that make up the Alaska Airlines doctrine. It
would allow judges to meet the requirements of the two constitutionally
mandated principles and to incorporate the prudential concerns raised by the
third without having to declare an entire omnibus statute inseverable. The
incompatibility option would be an elegant way of applying Alaska Airlines
while taking into account the unique characteristics of omnibus statutes.
The incompatibility option requires the judge to denote a fallback remedy
in the event that Congress takes no action during the period of the injunction.
The fallback remedy would specify the portions of a partially unconstitutional
law that judges could not enforce upon the injunction's expiration: both the
actually unconstitutional portions (as required by the severability-default
principle) and the portions of the statute so dependent on the unconstitutional
portions that they would not operate as law in their absence (as required by the
independent-remainder principle). If Congress did nothing, then the portions
of law constitutionally marked for excision would cease to have legal effect. If
Congress replaced the law, the replacement law would not include the
unconstitutional provisions. Any provisions that otherwise would have no
longer been "fully operative as a law" would be rescued from constitutional
1731
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nullification by having gone through a second round of Article I, Section 7
procedures. (In other words, they would not be the result of judicial rewriting,
having been approved by the elected branches.) No matter what, the remedy
satisfies the severability default and independent remainder principles.
The declaration of incompatibility and the temporary injunction,
furthermore, would satisfy the prudential concerns underlying the
hypothetical-passage principle. The incompatibility option would promote
interbranch respect: courts would not enforce statutes in a manner contrary to
the will of Congress. Ordinarily, courts use the hypothetical-passage principle
as a means of furthering comity; they strike severed laws from the books
entirely, lest they enforce a legislative scheme that Congress would not have
passed. The incompatibility option would advance comity in a different way by
not enforcing, at least in the short run, a severed law that Congress may not
have wanted -hence the temporary injunction. At the same time, the option
would give Congress the opportunity to revise the severed law in line with the
court's directive. Moreover, Congress could do so with full knowledge of its
policy options: it would know which parts of the old law were unconstitutional
and which parts would remain in force if it did not act. Finally, the
incompatibility option would avoid nullifying statutory provisions that have
been passed through the Article I, Section 7 procedures."
Comity, after all, is a two-sided coin. On the one hand, Congress does not
want courts to enforce laws that its members do not support. On the other
hand, Congress does want courts to enforce duly enacted law. The
constitutional incompatibility option would address both aspects of comity. It
is a legitimate substitute for conventional application of the hypothetical-
passage principle.
3. When Judges Should Employ the Incompatibility Option
This Section discusses the considerations that should guide judges in
deciding whether to employ the incompatibility option. For long, complex
statutes like the ACA, these considerations generally weigh in favor of using
the incompatibility option. They may also occasionally make the option
appropriate for shorter, more conventional statutes. Conversely, these
considerations show that there are some omnibus measures for which the
option is inadvisable. These considerations are aimed at serving the purpose of
269. Cf Garrett, supra note 48, at 3 ("As with any legislation that passes both houses of Congress
and is signed by the President or enacted over his veto, it deserves respect as a collective
achievement of elected representatives.").
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the hypothetical-passage principle by promoting comity between the judicial
and elected branches in the unique context of omnibus lawmaking.
The first consideration that judges should take into account is whether
Congress has offered any instructions about a statute's severability. As noted
previously, evidence of legislative intent tends to be inconclusive or nonexistent
for omnibus statutes. If it exists, however, it eases the decision-making process.
Severability clauses and analogous expressions in the legislative history counsel
against a finding of inseverability and in favor of pure severability or the
incompatibility option. Sufficiently strong intent, like the super-strong
severability clause hypothesized in Section II.C.4, might even counsel against
the incompatibility option: if Congress clearly wanted pure severability, there
is no point delaying implementation of the severed statute. At the same time,
the knowledge that a court might send a statute back to a potentially different
Congress might encourage congressional majorities to include more specific
severability clauses in omnibus bills. On the other hand, inseverability clauses
or expressions of contrary intent weigh in favor of a finding of inseverability or
the incompatibility option, depending on the strength of the congressional
instructions. If the evidence points to a weak preference for inseverability, then
the incompatibility option might be a better course than pure inseverability.27
Imagine a spectrum of evidence of legislative intent, from clearly in favor to
clearly against: evidence at either extreme militates in favor of conventional
determinations of severability or inseverability, while evidence in the middle
should guide the judge toward the incompatibility option.
The second consideration relates to the protracted substantive bargaining
that often characterizes complex legislation. For reasons of comity, a judge
should weigh the importance of provisions marked for excision to the
substantive bargain that produced the legislation. As with evidence of
legislative intent, imagine a sliding scale. On one end, the excised provisions
are tangential to the statute's substance, like the Black Lung Benefits Act was to
the ACA." For those, severability is preferable. On the other end, provisions
may run to the heart of the substantive bargain, so that Congress would not
have wanted the statute to stand in their absence. For those, inseverability is
warranted. In the middle, incompatibility makes more sense.
The third consideration is procedural bargaining. As discussed previously,
procedural bargaining ought to play a smaller role than substantive bargaining
270. The reason for this possibility is that legislative intent tends to be general. It may be that
Congress weakly favored inseverability for a piece of legislation in the abstract. In a
particular case where the constitutional blemish is small, Congress might prefer to weigh in
rather than have the law fall completely.
271. See supra note io and accompanying text.
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in the severability determination. There is no constitutional requirement that
every provision enacted into law have hypothetical majority support.
Nevertheless, we should consider a case in which a major set of provisions at
the heart of an omnibus act (for instance, the individual mandate, the Medicaid
expansion, and a host of other insurance reforms in the ACA) is ruled
unconstitutional. Would the law's unrelated Christmas ornaments have to fall
as well?
The key variable for judges to consider is the extent to which the
invalidated provisions were procedurally essential to the bill's passage. In light
of what we know about the legislative process for omnibus bills, this is a
difficult threshold to reach. It is true that Congress may not have preferred the
ACA to pass without one provision or another. But the ACA was an omnibus
bill that included a grab bag of legislative projects, tangentially related to
health, that members seized the opportunity to tack on. Congress's rules
allowed them to do so. The Constitution allowed them to do so. Unless it is
clear that a particular provision was a sine qua non of an omnibus bill's
formation and passage, it disrespects Congress and its procedures to choose
inseverability over the incompatibility option.
Judges, in other words, have two considerations to make. First, what kind
of bill was this? Was it a bill crafted around a single provision or reform, or
was it an omnibus bill that served as a vehicle for a number of unrelated
provisions? Judges can point to evidence from the bill's title, length, and
structure; the internal relatedness of its provisions; or whether it had a
recognizable, customary role in Congress's lawmaking (for instance, that it was
an annual appropriations bill) to determine Congress's expectations. Second, if
it was an omnibus bill, did it have a must-pass provision without which the bill
would not have materialized? For example, if the main provision in an
omnibus measure created a new agency and a court declared that provision
unconstitutional, inseverability would generally be the best approach.
Otherwise, the much more sensible options would be severability (if the bill is
clearly a grab-bag omnibus statute replete with unrelated measures) or
incompatibility (if the evidence is more ambiguous).
Finally, the judge should consider extrinsic concerns that a reasonable
legislator would take into account when deciding severability. These include
the significance of the statute's reforms, the public's reliance interest in having
the rest of the statute remain in force, the need for a clear and prompt
determination of severability, and the perception of bias or judicial
overreaching. The common thread of these concerns is the need to consider
whether Congress or the judge is in the best position to determine severability.
If the legislation is significant, it may be better for Congress to have the ability
to make the severability determination itself, pursuant to a declaration of
constitutional incompatibility and temporary injunction. The same goes if
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injury to the public would result from invalidation of the statute's remainder.
On the other hand, if the public would be better served by an immediate
severability determination, rather than a drawn-out injunction and political
debate, the judge might choose pure severability or inseverability. In general, a
risk-averse judge may favor placing the ball in Congress's court by using the
incompatibility option, rather than potentially making the wrong choice
between severability and inseverability.
IV. ANSWERING OBJECTIONS TO THE INCOMPATIBILITY-OPTION
APPROACH
This Part answers possible objections to the constitutional incompatibility
approach. The first objection is that it is unconstitutional to transplant the
incompatibility option into American law. The second is that the possibility of
congressional inaction will nullify the potential benefits of the constitutional
incompatibility option. The third objection is that the option produces too
much uncertainty about the state of the law during the period in which the
effect of the statute is enjoined. The final objection is that the incompatibility
option insufficiently protects people harmed by enjoined declarations of
unconstitutionality. Properly examined, however, none of these objections
should prevent or discourage courts from employing the incompatibility
option.
A. Objection One: The Constitutionality of Transplanting the Incompatibility
Option into American Law
The strongest objection to American courts' adoption of the incompatibility
approach is that the German and American legal systems are too different for
one to import the remedial techniques of the other. The German
Constitutional Court plays a strongly interventionist role in German
lawmaking, regularly issuing advisory opinions.7 American federal courts
have the power to decide cases and controversies;7 they do not engage in the
same kind of supervision of the legislative process that the German
Constitutional Court does. One must consider whether the incompatibility
option would unconstitutionally aggrandize the federal courts' role in the
balance of powers.
A careful analysis shows that the incompatibility option would not violate
Article III's constraints on the federal courts' powers. The key question is
272. KoMMERs & MILLER, supra note 247, at 36.
273. U.S. CONST. art. III, 5 2.
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whether use of the incompatibility option requires the federal courts to issue
advisory opinions. Under Article III, the federal courts only have jurisdiction
over ripe, adversarial, and concrete cases or controversies in which the
appropriate parties have standing to sue.'7 The incompatibility option does
not undermine these requirements.
To begin, it is important to recognize that the incompatibility option is a
remedy."s It is a tool used at the remedial stage of a federal suit, after the court
has already determined that the application of a statute violated the
Constitution. In order for a court to use the incompatibility option, it must
have been properly seized of jurisdiction in a case involving a federal statute.
There must be an Article III case or controversy.
With this in mind, we can imagine two ways that the incompatibility
option-or, for that matter, any remedy-could cause a court's opinion to
become advisory. First, it could cause the court's opinion no longer to address
or affect the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the suit. This type of
argument was used to challenge the Declaratory Judgment Act; declaratory
judgments, so the argument went, are advisory because they declare the law
without actually giving either party a remedy. 76 Second, the court's opinion
could touch and concern legal issues outside the scope of the case or
controversy. If a federal court has before it a case on alleged violations of the
Clean Air Act, it would be advisory for the court to decide that the ACA is
unconstitutional. We can picture these two arguments in the following way. At
all stages of litigation, there needs to be fit between the Article III case or
controversy and a federal court's jurisdiction. In the first case, the court's
jurisdiction becomes underinclusive at the remedial stage: its opinion no
274. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 1o3, Lo8 (1969) (stating that federal courts do not issue
advisory opinions).
275. Erik Zimmerman has argued that it is inappropriate to call severability a "remedial" doctrine
because severability doctrine is not about making litigants whole but rather clarifying the
continued validity of a statute's provisions. Erik R. Zimmerman, Supplemental Standing for
Severability, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. 285, 302, 319-21 (2015). This Note follows the Court's
tradition of treating severability as a remedy. See id. at 302 n.1o (citing cases that call
severability a "remedy"). It is true, however, that the severability determination differs in
some aspects from a typical remedy. See id. at 320-21 (noting that severability focuses on
legislative intent rather than on the individual litigant and that severability determinations
have greater precedential value). The Court treats severability as a separate question from
the merits of a case. In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), for example, different
Justices wrote the Court's opinion on the merits and on the question of severability.
Ultimately, whether one considers severability a remedy or an application of "supplemental
standing," see Zimmerman, supra, at 332-35, the result is the same: a federal court must be
seized ofArticle III jurisdiction to decide severability.
276. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Comment, Constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment, 30
YALE L.J. 161, 163 (1920).
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longer remedies the parties' injuries. In the second case, the court's jurisdiction
is overinclusive: it rules on legal issues unnecessary to decide the case or
controversy.
Neither situation occurs when a court employs the incompatibility option.
With respect to the first case, it is worth recalling exactly what the
incompatibility option involves. A court decides that a federal statute is at least
partially unconstitutional. The court determines the appropriate remedy for the
constitutional violation with respect to the parties, as well as with respect to the
statute in question, invalidating only so much of the statute as is
constitutionally required. The court then enjoins the effect of the remedy until
a defined date. When that date is reached, the remedy goes into effect-
including the aspect of the remedy that addressed the constitutional violation
at issue. The incompatibility option, in other words, causes the court to
address or affect the legal rights and obligations of the parties as it otherwise
would.
The second case is more problematic for the incompatibility option, but it
proves too much and is inconsistent with America's constitutional tradition.
The United States made a similar argument in its severability brief in NFIB.2 "
The ACA was severable, the government argued, because the plaintiff had
standing to challenge only the constitutionality of the individual mandate,
which was solely responsible for the plaintiffs injury. The government
maintained that NFIB lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
law's remainder. The federal courts, therefore, did not have Article III
jurisdiction to strike down the entire statute.' 8 This is an interesting
argument, and an intuitively attractive one. It comports with the Founding-Era
approach to severability discussed in Section II.C.i, whereby judges did not
adjudge the constitutionality of more of a statute than was at issue in a case. If
the government's position is correct, however, then the whole of modern
severability doctrine -including the independent remainder and hypothetical
passage principles -is constitutionally suspect. Courts would never be able to
invalidate an entire statute unless it was completely unconstitutional or unless
a plaintiff was injured by every single provision of a law. Such a conclusion
contravenes 150 years of constitutional history." Moreover, it ignores the
Article I presentment requirement discussed in Section II.C.2 -namely, that in
277. Brief for Respondents at 16-19, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct 2566
(2012) (Nos. 11-393 & 11-400); see also Fish, supra note 14, at 1343-44 (advancing a similar
argument).
278. Brief for Respondents, supra note 277, at 16-19.
279. See Zimmerman, supra note 275, at 322-27 (discussing the incongruity between this standing
argument and the Court's longstanding approach to severability).
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addition to deciding whether the parts of a statute at issue in a case are
constitutional, courts must also decide whether the statute's remainder
constitutes valid "law." The result could be inconsistent, incoherent statutes
that Congress could never have enacted.
Furthermore, even if correct, this argument would not invalidate the
incompatibility option. As discussed above, the incompatibility option does not
require a court to rule on the constitutionality of parts of a statute beyond those
at issue in the case or controversy. In fact, even assuming the government's
position is correct in NFIB, the incompatibility option is a perfect addition to
the Alaska Airlines doctrine, because it allows the court to stay within the
government's understanding of Article III's bounds while preventing the
practical problems that could arise from partial invalidation.
Not only does the incompatibility option, as a formal matter, not require
the issuance of advisory opinions, it also does not violate the principle
underlying the rule against advisory opinions: it does not aggrandize courts'
power. The incompatibility option does not force Congress to take any action.
If Congress does not act, then the default remedy-the least legislatively
invasive remedy required by the Constitution - goes into effect after a period of
time. Nor does the ability to delay its own judgment aggrandize a court's
power. A delay in a judgment declaring an act of Congress partially
unconstitutional- one intended, moreover, to give Congress the chance to
replace the statutory scheme if it so wishes-does not place a burden on
Congress or allow a court to intervene more than it otherwise could. The
incompatibility option is judicially modest, especially in comparison to the
alternatives.
Moreover, there are grounds to reject the premise of this objection: the
incompatibility option is not alien to American judicial practice. The notion
that courts and the legislature should participate in a dialogue when deciding
how to fix an unconstitutional statute dates back to Holmes v. Walton, when the
New Jersey Supreme Court recommended that the New Jersey legislature
replace a partially unconstitutional statute prior to voiding it.8o State courts
have engaged in this sort of dialogic practice more recently." Most
importantly, federal courts have used the incompatibility option before. In the
well-known case of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co.," the Supreme Court granted two stays of its ruling declaring the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 unconstitutional in order to give Congress
280. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A. 3d ioi8, 1041-43 (N.J. 2011) (concerning right-
to-education issues).
282. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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time to replace the Act and avoid creating hardship for the public. ' The Court
essentially employed the incompatibility option. It did not even think to
consider the idea that this exercise of power was unconstitutional. It is hard to
argue that the incompatibility option cannot be imported into American law
when the Supreme Court has already employed it.
B. Objection Two: The Problem ofLegislative Intransigence
One could also object that the constitutional incompatibility approach
might not have any chance of practical success in the United States. Congress's
procedures create ample opportunities for a minority of the legislature to block
new statutes .1 If a minority favored a court's severability-default remedy, it
could delay legislative action until the end of the interim period. The court's
default remedy would become law without attracting the clear support of a
legislative majority.
This objection, however, fails to show that the incompatibility option
would exacerbate legislative intransigence more than courts' current menu of
severability remedies. As it stands, if a court invalidates an entire law and sends
it back to the legislature, a determined minority can prevent the repassage of
even a single provision of the original law. In this event, the difference between
the incompatibility option and total nullification would ultimately be between
preserving constitutional portions of a law that had once attracted majority
support and frustrating the majority's legislative project entirely. The former is
surely the better outcome.
To make the advantages of the incompatibility option clearer, we can think
about the two approaches in the following way. Under the hypothetical-
passage approach, a court invalidates an entire omnibus statute and sends it
back to Congress. Because of legislative intransigence, it is likely that Congress
passes no new statute and every benefit that could have resulted from the
legislative project is abandoned. The opponents of legislative action win.
Under the incompatibility approach, if Congress does nothing, the nation is
left with a law that is potentially imperfect but whose beneficial provisions are
still in force. Ideologically motivated opponents of legislative action can do
nothing to tear down the remainder of the law, unless they can convince
Congress and the country that the remainder is too terrible to stand even in
part. In an intransigent Congress, the only legislative action that will succeed is
a83. See Note, supra note 164, at 1182 & n.7.
284. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. EcON. &
ORG. 756 (2012) (describing the "vetogates" inherent in the congressional lawmaking
process).
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action that improves the severed law. The incompatibility option, in other
words, respects and favors legislative action-exactly what is needed in a
period of gridlock.
C. Objection Three: The Effects on Vulnerable Individuals
One might still worry that, even if the incompatibility option were good for
the nation as a whole, a severed law might create undue harms to particular
individuals or groups. For example, if the Court were to rule that it was
unconstitutional for the federal government -but not for state governments-
to run health-insurance exchanges, that could impair the ACA's statutory
scheme for millions of Americans. At the same time, this ruling would reduce
the pressure on Congress to pass a new law, because the millions of Americans
who would still benefit would not exert electoral pressure. Should courts not
try to prevent this result?
There are two responses to this. The first is that this Note does not propose
that constitutional incompatibility should replace the hypothetical-passage
principle. If there is clear evidence that Congress would not have passed the
remainder of a law through Article I, Section 7 procedures -particularly
because the remainder of the law will be patently undesirable on its own-
courts may still step in and invalidate the entire law.
But suppose that, while there is no such clear evidence, the resulting
statutory scheme is still arguably undesirable. Should courts not step in then?
No, they should not. Courts need not solve every ill that results from the
application of constitutional principles. It falls to Congress to fix the problem.
Furthermore, if we assume congressional gridlock would stymie any new
legislation, it would still be more desirable for millions to have health insurance
than for none to have it at all. In a period of legislative inaction, it is better to
make the preservation of legislative action the default. It is far more dangerous,
on the other hand, to give courts carte blanche to invalidate otherwise
constitutional portions of laws, and thus to destroy entire statutory schemes.
D. Objection Four: The Problem of Uncertainty in the Interim
Finally, there is the problem of figuring out how the state should enforce a
statute during the period allotted to Congress to develop its own remedy. One
must concede that, for all of its flaws, the current severability regime has the
virtue of clarity: courts, Congress, and the public know-or at least have some
idea -on the day of the decision to what extent a law is voided. Under the
incompatibility option, the minimum extent of a law's invalidity would be clear
on the day of the judgment, but the fate of the law's constitutional and
severable provisions would not.
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The problem of uncertainty is not entirely absent from courts' current
approach to severability. If the Supreme Court had struck down the ACA in its
entirety, everyone who had relied on the law prior to the Court's ruling would
have had to deal with the uncertainty of whether and when Congress would
reenact the constitutional provisions of the law. The incompatibility option
could in fact reduce this uncertainty by giving Congress a definite window to
remedy a law before a court's judgment takes effect. Even so, it is undeniable
that uncertainty would remain. Courts in particular would face the challenge of
figuring out how to decide pending cases in the interim. It would be manifestly
unfair for the state to enforce statutory provisions that the Supreme Court has
declared unconstitutional for a certain period and then, at a predetermined
time, cease to enforce those provisions.
Courts possess two means of ameliorating this problem. First, they could
enjoin the effect of their decisions for only so long as is reasonably necessary
for Congress to have a chance to enact its own remedy. Narrowing the duration
of the injunction would reduce the period of uncertainty as to the law's fate.28s
Second, courts could follow the German example and not decide cases on the
basis of the constitutionally incompatible law in the interim.' 6 They could
hold over cases until the end of the injunctive period.
Neither of these solutions would fully solve the problem of uncertainty,
especially insofar as constitutional rights are concerned. The sky might not
have fallen if an injunction had created a few months of uncertainty about the
ACA's fate. But if the effect of a declaration of incompatibility were to keep
someone wrongly in prison for that same period of time, or to squelch free
expression, or to delay needed welfare benefits, the costs of the incompatibility
approach would rise. This problem is precisely why the Court did not enjoin
the effect of its decision in Califano v. Westcott.11
Courts should therefore deploy the incompatibility option selectively. In
Schachter v. Canada,"8 the Canadian Supreme Court stated that courts should
base their decision of whether to use a "delayed declaration[] of nullity" -
essentially, the incompatibility option -on "considerations relating to the effect
of an immediate declaration on the public."89 The court also noted that this
285. It would, however, make it easier for a determined congressional minority to block any
revision of the law: the minority would only have to impede repassage for a short period of
time, whereas proponents of revision would have less time to mobilize support.
286. KoMMERs & MILLER, supra note 247, at 37.
287. 443 U.S. 76, 90 (1979) ("[A]n injunction suspending the program's operation would
impose hardship on beneficiaries whom Congress plainly meant to protect.").
288. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
289. Id. at 684.
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remedy is especially appropriate to cases where voiding the law would "pose[]
a potential danger to the public or otherwise threaten[] the rule of law."29o
Applying these principles to the severability decision would maintain the
proper balance between respecting legislative intent and protecting individual
rights.
CONCLUSION
This Note has explored and tried to address the defects of applying current
severability doctrine to omnibus statutes. It looked at the flexibility that courts
have to modify severability doctrine. It found that while the severability default
and independent remainder principles - two of the three principles of current
severability doctrine-are constitutionally required, the hypothetical-passage
principle is a federal common law doctrine that can be bypassed on prudential
grounds. Omnibus lawmaking presents a situation in which prudential
concerns weigh against applying the hypothetical-passage principle to strike
down an entire statute. Even so, there are prudential reasons to involve
Congress in the severability decision in some way.
A solution to the problem exists: the constitutional incompatibility option.
Under this approach, courts would engage in a dialogue with Congress. Courts
would invalidate the unconstitutional portions of a law, but they would enjoin
the effect of their decisions to give Congress time to rework the legislative
scheme if it so desires. The incompatibility option does not violate any
principle of American constitutional law and is even preferable in light of the
climate of intransigence that currently envelops Congress. Most importantly, it
addresses many of the special challenges that omnibus statutes pose to the
application of canonical severability doctrine.
The hope is that this piece will spur the scholarship and judicial
experimentation necessary to make the incompatibility option a productive
constituent of American jurisprudence. There are many parameters that only
further analysis and experience can elucidate. What is the appropriate length of
time to enjoin the effect of a finding of partial unconstitutionality? How
specifically should courts preview the remedy that takes effect in the event
Congress does not act? How should federal agencies' experience with the
"remand without vacatur" remedy"' inform the correct approach to sending
statutes back to Congress? All of these questions merit further study.
29o. Id. at 715 (citations omitted).
a91. "Remand without vacatur" refers to finding an agency's rulemaking process legally deficient
without invalidating the rule itself. Kristina Daugirdas, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur:
A New Judicial Remedy for Defective Agency Rulemakings, 8o N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 279 (2005).
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The incompatibility option is a relatively simple solution. The most
common reaction to learning of it, I hope, will be: why don't courts do this
already? The German Constitutional Court has employed the incompatibility
option successfully for more than fifty years. American courts should adopt it.
If they do, no federal court would have to deal with the difficult -and false-
choice that the Supreme Court might have faced if it had decided the merits of
NFIB differently. Courts can and should look beyond severability and
inseverability.
Note that the traditional remand-without-vacatur emedy is conceptually different from the
constitutional incompatibility option because there is no default remedy of partial
invalidation if the agency does not act. Remand without vacatur either lacks "teeth," id. at
282, or leverages the devastating threat of invalidating the entire rule at the end of a
specified period, id. at 306. The history of remand without vacatur could, however, provide
valuable insight into how best o structure the constitutional incompatibility option.
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